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This thesis deals with the reaction of Greensboro, 
North Carolina, to Negro demands for equal opportunity during 
the period May—July, 1963. 
During this three month period, blacks in the city 
had three main objectives:  achieving equal employment 
opportunities in the city, getting qualified blacks on 
city boards and commissions, and achieving desegregation 
at Greensboro's privately-owned public accommodations. 
The businessmen who ran these facilities feared a loss 
of white customers and believed, because North Carolina 
had no law enforcing desegregation, that they could 
discriminate.  The city government took a middleman 
position in the dispute.  Promises from the city government 
to mediate had ended previous direct action attempts on the 
part of Negroes to achieve their objectives. 
On May 11, two weeks of sustained demonstrations 
by blacks began in an attempt to gain service at public 
facilities. Moving into the downtown area, the blacks 
attempted to desegregate two cafeterias and two theaters. 
In an effort to end the direct action, the mayor appointed 
the Special Committee to negotiate with the management.  On 
May 25, three days after the setting up of this committee, 
the wave of demonstrations ended. 
The failure of the Special Committee to achieve 
success in negotiations led to the end of the truce and 
demonstrations  began again on June 2.     Silent marches,   led 
by members of   the  city's four black civil rights groups,   were 
staged for the next   three nights.     Blacks then  turned to 
"sit-dovms" in major thoroughfares of the city and the city 
government began to  fear violence. 
On  June   7,   the mayor made  a  speech urging blacks 
to   stop demonstrations and insisting that businessmen change 
their policy.     Meetings were held between the mayor and the 
businessmen on June  13 and II4..     These meetings produced 
the  desegregation of the indoor theaters,   several restaurants, 
and a  few motels.     Over the next few months, more facilities 
also agreed to   change. 
Aside from gains made in  this area,   success was also 
achieved in promotions in  city positions and the  lowering 
of racial  barriers within the Greensboro Housing Authority. 
Despite   the  failure  of blacks  to achieve  the goal of equal 
opportunity,   important gains were made  through the use  of 
non-violent direct action. 
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CHAPTER li  INTRODUCTION 
A large segment of the domestic history of the United 
States in the decade of the 1960's was concerned with the 
struggle of the Negro to achieve equal opportunity within 
the American system.  Prior to 1954, Negro organizations, 
such as the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, tended to rely on court suits to remove 
the barriers of discrimination and segregation.  In that 
year, the Supreme Court of the United States decided in the 
case, Brown v. the Board of Education, that Vlseparate but 
equal" schools were not equal and ordered segregated schools 
to change their racial make-up "with all deliberate speed." 
This decision represented the zenith in legal battles for 
equal opportunity.  Despite this success, a change in the 
basic Negro strategy would become apparent after 1955. 
On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks refused to stand 
up for a white person on a Montgomery, Alabama, city bus, vio- 
lating the bus segregation law.  Word spread throughout the 
Negro community in the city, creating a reaction like one 
which had been tried previously in the North in 1942.  Black 
leaders instituted a boycott of the city bus system. 
Ordered for only one day, the tactic was later extended until 
certain demands were met, including the end of segregated 
seating on the bus lines.  The result was the formal be- 
ginning of non-violent direct action. 
Non-violent, direct action has a long and proud history 
in the twentieth century.  While some would claim that non- 
violence extends back to Jesus Christ, its modern foundations 
may be found in the life and teachings of the Indian leader, 
Mahatma Gandhi.  Gandhi referred to his method as 'satygraha1 
or the belief that one must not only combat evil, but refuse 
1 
to cooperate with it.  In terms of Negro activities, the non- 
violent technique represents the refusal of blacks to retal- 
iate against white harrassment.  Combined with non-violence is 
the theory of direct action.  As defined by Martin Luther King, 
direct action 
is a method of acting to rectify a social situation that 
is unjust and it involves in engaging in a practical tech- 
nique that nullifies the use of violence or calls for 
non-violence at every point.2 
The combination of these two methods gave the black man an 
important weapon. 
The new strategy depended on various tactics if it was 
to succeed.  As the method was applied to different situations, 
the variety of tactics grew.  These techniques served several 
important purposes.  First, they tended to injure, socially 
or economically, various groups of businesses that hindered 
the Negro in what he felt should have been his normal, everyday 
activity in American society.  They helped to point out to 
 3—  
Southern Regional Council, "Direct Action in the Soutl? 
in Minority Problems edited by Arnold and Caroline Rose, (New 
York:     Harper and Row,   1965) $   P.   14-01. 
2 
Kenneth Clark, The Negro Protest. (Boston:  Beacon Press, 
196$), p. 39. 
individuals  or groups   that an  injustice was being  committed 
against  the Negro.    More  importantly to  those  participating, 
these  tactics had  proven  "to be well-suited for  situations  in 
which a minority  lacks  access  to major  sources  of power and 
to  the instruments  of violent  coercion."       Finally,   they 
provided  the  Negro with his   "first  taste  of  self-determination 
k 
and political   self-expression."       No  longer must  the  black 
man rely on  the  courts  or a handful   of leaders  to achieve his 
desires.     He   should participate  in  the  tactics  of non-violent, 
direct action  to achieve  his  objectives personally. 
The  list  of  tactics  is worth reviewing.     The  first 
tactic  to achieve   success was  the   sit-in.     The   sit-in was 
5 
first used by members  of  the  Congress  of Racial  Equality       in 
Chicago in I9I4.2.     Negroes  entered a   segregated  facility and 
asked for  service.     If   service  was  denied,   the  participants 
would  then  take  seats  in  the  establishment and  refuse   to 
leave.     Other   tactics  stemmed  from  the basic  sit-in  idea.     A 
stand-in,   a  similar technique,   relied on  standing in  the 
business  area,   instead  of  sitting.     A park-in was used  at 
 T 
James  Vander  Zanden 
(New York:     Random House 
,   Race  Relations 
,   1965),  P.   56. 
in  Transition. 
James  Farmer,  Freedom-When?.   (New York:     Random House, 
1965),   P.   36. 
The  Congress  of Racial Equality was  founded in  Chicago 
in 19l|2.     The  organization was   small  for many years,   not be- 
coming prominent until   I960 during  the  sit-in movement.   By 
1963,   it had 61,000 members.     CORE was  considered the  fore- 
runner in non-violent,   direct action  techniques. 
drive-ins.  This concept involved having the "participants... 
6 
return to their automobiles and wait quietly..."  If the 
use of any of these strategems resulted in the arrest of 
demonstrators, a jail-in could be used.  Instead of posting 
7 
bond, those arrested would remain in prison. 
Other devices were used to accommodate a large number 
of people.  A silent march helped to show many outsiders that 
an injustice was taking place.  Picketing was another meth- 
od.  Those taking part would parade up and down in front of 
an establishment, carrying signs specifying the grievances 
of the black community.  A final tactic for a large number 
of participants was an attempt to gain admission to a seg- 
regated business.  If they were refused, those who sought 
admission could then turn to more demonstrative tactics. 
Two other techniques were designed to involve the entire 
black community.  A ooycott, used in Montgomery in 1955— 
1956, meant, usually, that one aspect of economic life in 
the city would not be used by the Negroes.  A selective- 
buying campaign meant that places of a certain type of 
facility or in a designated area would not be patronized 
by the black community wnile otner places of tnis facility 
or in this area would be used. 
A final tecnnique, relied on by the demonstrators to 
create confusion, was the mass arrest.  Negroes would 
 5  
Greensboro Record. July 13# 1962, p. B-l. 
Durham 3un. August 15» 1962. 
deliberately violate a city or state law, forcing arrests 
and remain in prison once arrested.  The city was compelled 
to provide facilities to hold those arrested, and in many 
cases, the normal jails would not be adequate and other 
facilities had to be found. 
The national office of CORE demanded that its local 
leaders always attempt to approach the problem of change with 
negotiation, either with the management of segregated busi- 
nesses or with the city machinery, usually a human relations 
committee.  Once this had been done, the demonstrators then 
8 
moved on to a more active tactic if negotiation failed. 
The March on Washington, staged in August, 1963, was the 
most important event of the non-violent, direct action move- 
ment prior to the passage by Congress, in 1961;, of the first 
substantial civil rights bill since 1875.  The events that 
led to this march included demonstrations occurring in the 
streets of many large cities, north and south, in the spring 
and summer of 1963.  The activities in those months repre- 
sented the supreme attempts for change on a local level. 
In the previous nine years, various elements attempted 
to assist the Negro in his quest for equal opportunity.  The 
Supreme Court of the United States struck down segregation 
in many areas through various decisions made after 1951J-. 
The principle of outlawing unequal separate accommodations 
 5  
Lewis Killian. The Impossible Revolution?  (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1968), p. 75. 
was applied by the high court and lower courts "to the whole 
9 
field of public  facilities...,11    which were owned by state 
or local governments.     Congress attacked a few of the in- 
justices in the voting   system with the passage of civil 
rights bills in 1957 and I960.    The final element was the 
President of the United States.    In the campaign of I960, 
the Democratic  candidate,   John Kennedy,   expressed an inter- 
est in the aspirations  of black people,  and his actions  "con- 
vinced the great majority of Negroes  that Kennedy would be a 
10 
bold and effective champion of their cause."       Despite  these 
worthwhile beginnings,   none of the  three elements  seemed 
willing,   prior to  1963,   to carry through their efforts  to 
a  logical conclusion.   This failure  created a  sense of frus- 
tration in the minds of many black leaders.   Their hopes 
raised,   their patience almost gone,  Negro leaders turned 
to non-violent direct action to achieve the goal. 
While direct action through non-violence  existed on a 
substantial scale before 1963#  larger-scale demonstrations 
were  staged in that year.   On the one-hundredth anniversary 
of the Emancipation Proclamation,   the feeling that its 
promises were  still unfulfilled created a sense of urgency. 
Dr.  King and his followers  took to the   streets in Birmingham, 
Alabama, to protest  the  discrimination and segregation that 
Benjamin Muse,   The American Negro Revolution.   (India- 
napolis:     Indiana University Press,   i960),   p.  I4.I. 
10 
Harold Fleming, "The Federal Executive and Civil 
Rights" in The Negro American edited by Talcott Parsons and 
Kenneth Clark, (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 371. 
existed there, and the violent white reaction that met the 
demonstrators angered black leaders throughout the nation. 
In city after city, Negroes turned to direct action to 
achieve change. 
In 1963, Negro civil rights advocates had five basic 
objectives:  equal voting rights, equal opportunity in 
employment, the end of segregated education, equal oppor- 
tunity in housing, and the end of segregation in public 
11 
accommodations.   The achievement of these objectives 
would increase the chances of reaching eventually the 
long-sought equal opportunity in all facets of American 
life. 
Public accommodations were a target of the strategy 
from its beginning.  Public facilities may, of course 
take various forms.  They may be owned by the state or 
local government or they can be privately owned. They 
may consist of a chain of interstate businesses or a 
single establishment in a certain city.  Basically, public 
accommodations are facilities, either owned publically or 
privately, that are used by the general public. 
The constitutional sanctions for segregation in public 
accommodations had been laid down by the Supreme Court 
decision in PiesBY V. Ferguson in 1896.  Eventually, this 
type of segregation was changed by court decisions and by 
laws adopted in various states and cities which prohibited 
11 
Muse, p. $l\.. 
8 
the practice.  By 1963, thirty states and five cities had 
outlawed segregation in public facilities. However, no 
southern state had enacted such a statute. In some cases, 
laws were still on the books which provided a legal basis 
for separation of the races.  In others, 'local custom1 
prevailed. Under this practice no (or very few) businessmen 
operated their establishment on a desegregated basis. 
Non-violent, direct action was easily applied to this 
problem.  In terms of the movement itself, the work to 
desegregate public facilities "was the easiest and least 
12 
complicated of the five.. .objectives..."   Denial of equal 
opportunity in this area offended a large number of Negroes. 
According to Muse, 
to be turned away from a hotel or restaurant because of 
his color was not only one of the cruelest humiliations 
that the sensitive Negro suffered, but the practice 
imposed serious physical hardships.13 
The tactics of direct action were easily adapted to fit 
such efforts.  Finally, in this area, "segregation found 
Ik 
l^he] least rational justification."   For these reasons 
demonstrations staged to end segregation in public accom- 
modations were held in many cities.  Often, this was the 
primary objective to which other desires could be added. 
12 
Ibid, p. 59. 
13 
Ibid. 
Ik 
Ibid. 
9 
The main participants in these demonstrations were 
black students.  In many sections of the nation, "the student 
demonstrated both high militancy and a degree of creative- 
15 
ness and daring that had not been seen before."   Black 
students had led the sit-in movement of I960—1961 and the 
freedom rides in 1961. They possessed a "new attitude and 
new outlook" achieved through time spent in school, their 
observations on American life and their impatience with the 
16 
slowness of the legal process.   The black students were 
well-fitted for the role they played. 
The purpose of this work is to present a study of the 
reaction of one city, Greensboro, North Carolina, to black 
demands for equal opportunity during a three-month period, 
May—July, 1963. 
Greensboro is a city of approximately 130,000 in the 
northern Piedmont region of North Carolina.  The city is 
the home of a number of industries, including Burlington 
and Cone Mills.  Also located there are five colleges, 
providing an influence aside from that of business and indus- 
try.  Tradition and moderation were evident in the city 
since the turn of the century. 
The black demands for change in the city had begun in 
 15  
William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution 
in America. (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1961j.), p. 111+. 
16 
North Carolina Council on Human Relations, The Free- 
dom Riders. Raleigh, 1961. 
10 
the  1950'a.     The  city's population  of Negroes,  which num- 
bered approximately twenty-five per cent of the city's total, 
tended to  rely  on  the work of  the  local chapter of the  NAACP, 
led by a  black dentist,  Dr.  George  Simkins.     Like  the  parent 
organization,   the   local  chapter used  the  courts  to end dis- 
crimination and segregation  in public  facilities  controlled 
by  the  city.     Any  efforts  on  this  level were  slow.     Simkins 
and his  followers  also  sought  to  end  the  segregation in  the 
local   school  district and achieve  equal  employment  in city 
positions. 
The   city government itself provided much of the  change. 
Voluntarily,  it desegregated the bus lines and the public 
library.     The result was the eventual desegregation of all 
public  facilities   owned by  the  city by 1961. 
In  I960,   the   tempo of the  civil  rights movement  in 
Greensboro was  sharply accelerated.     That year would  see 
the appearance  of a new strategy that would place  the  city 
government  in a  shaky position.     The  new enemy became  the 
businessmen  of  the   city—those merchants who refused  to 
serve  Negroes  or ran  their facility on a  segregated basis. 
The  new  strategy was non-violent direct action.     Sit-ins 
conducted  by  Negro   students  from the  two black  colleges, 
North Carolina A and T  College  and Bennett College,   led to 
the  desegregation  of  the  lunch counters  of two downtown 
variety  stores.     In  1961 and  1962,  Greensboro was chosen as 
a   site  by  CORE and  the Student  Non-Violent Coordinating 
11 
17 
Committee        for further attempts to open public accommoda- 
tions  to blacks.     The Freedom Highways program,   staged by 
CORE in the summer of 1962 resulted in a change of policy 
at a handful  of chain facilities that had operations in  the 
city.    Despite these efforts,  all motion picture theaters, 
many  restaurants and motels,   and the  city's  two hotels were 
still either segregated or did not serve Negroes in any way. 
In  September,   1962,  new efforts  were launched by  the 
local  chapter of CORE,   now led by an A and T  student,  William 
Thomas.     While  still in high  school,   Thomas had helped carry 
the  sit-ins  into  the  summer of I960.     He was  well-trained 
in the   tactics and principles  of non-violent direct action. 
The  CORE  leader was  able   to mobilize  his  small,   but vigorous 
chapter into an important force that was in a position to 
demand  reform. 
Student demonstrations  and the reaction  of the  city 
government and businessmen  to  them find their roots  in the 
period,   September—November,   1962.     After September 30,   the 
black demands were one of the main concerns of the city 
and owners and managers of segregated businesses.    This 
concern would continue into the following year and become 
the dominant interest in May—July. 
18 
17 
The  Student  Non-Violent  Coordinating  Committee was 
formed in April,  I960.; at Shaw University in Raleigh,  North 
Carolina.     Controlled by students and other young people, 
its main  emphasis was on direct action. 
18 
Greensboro Record. May 23, 1963, p. B-l. 
12 
The   three groups had  character traits  in common.     All 
believed their position to be right.    The city government 
pursued a policy of mediation.    The only purpose of the 
Mayor's Committee on Human Relations,  set up in the  summer 
of 1962,  was negotiation.     Never did the city believe that 
it could force businesses to change their policy.     The 
merchants thought that the  legal basis for their "rights" 
and the profit motive were enough to see them through. 
The Negroes believed that it was their right to receive all 
the advantages of "first-class" citizens,  including the 
right  to  gain  service  at any public  facility.     All   three 
were stubborn, and unlikely to budge unless an outside force 
prodded them into action. 
The  dominant  theme in  this  story of response  is  prodding 
or the turning of the  screw.     None of the groups was willing 
to act unless pressed to do so.    This is true even in the 
case of the Negroes.     The primary pressure on the black 
groups was the failure of the other two groups to change 
their positions.     The oity government found itself coerced 
by  the demonstrations.     The  businessmen felt  the  arm-twisting 
from both sides.     In all three cases one final,  overriding 
action brought so much pressure to bear that the only re- 
course was a change of position. 
13 
CHAPTER  2:     THE PRELIMINARIES:     SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER,   1962 
The Mayor's Committee 
The policy of the  city government,   with regard to 
racial matters,   embodied   several principles.     First,   the 
city believed that it could persuade the owners of businesses 
to change  their positions.     The best means  to achieve this 
objective was negotiation,  a resort which was used success- 
fully during the   sit-in movement in I960.     The  city never 
believed,   however,   that it  could go any farther than the 
middleman role.     An ordinance outlawing  segregation could 
not be passed because the   courts had not given  city govern- 
ments  that power.     Finally,   the city gradually adopted the 
position of approving of desegregation but disapproving  of 
the means used to bring it about.     This position had been 
worked out by the end of 1962.    The development of the 
policy occurred after a series of demonstrations that took 
place in the late fall of  that year. 
The  city government began the development of its 
policy in July,   1962, when Mayor David Schenck appointed the 
Mayor's Committee  on Human Relations.     The  committee was 
assigned to  study practices and customs most likely 
to create animosity among groups and by quiet consulta- 
tion with those involved,  seek solutions to problems 
in human relations as they arise or as they are 
anticipated.19 
Despite  this lofty statement of purpose,  the group was not 
19 
Greensboro Daily News.   September 15,   1963,   p.   C-l. 
Ik 
appointed merely because the city felt compelled to take a 
hand in solving racial problems, but also because establish- 
ment of the committee was prerequisite to the city's role 
20 
in a federally assisted housing program.   Nevertheless, 
the city now possessed the machinery to carry on negotia- 
tions if it desired. 
The membership of the committee reflected another 
basic position of the city.  The majority of the members 
were businessmen, because the city believed that this type 
of individual was best suited to take some sort of action. 
After all, the city government, based on the city manager 
system, was run like a business.  Also, businessmen were 
considered best able to deal with other businessmen, the 
people to be dealt with if desegregation was to be pressed 
by the Negro leadership in the city.  The group consisted 
of nine members, two black and seven white.  The blacks 
were Dr. L. C. Dowdy, acting president of A and T College, 
and Dr. W. L. T. Miller, a dentist.  The five businessmen 
on the committee were Oscar Burnett, president of Bessemer 
Improvement Company; Jack Elan, a lawyer, employed by Cone 
Mills; Howard Holderness, president of the Jefferson Standard 
Life Insurance Company; George Roach, a realtor; and Bland 
Worley, Senior Vice-President of Wachovia Bank and Trust Com- 
pany.  The two remaining members were Rev. R. Harold Hipp3, 
a minister of education at a local church, and Bmily Preyer, 
20 
Ibid. 
15 
the wife  of a   judge who was,   incidentally,   an heir to  the 
21 
Richardson-Merrill   (Vick Chemical)   fortune. 
By September,   there was no specific  evidence  that 
the  committee was making any headway in obtaining a  change 
of policy.     Attempts at  desegregation had been taking place 
during the   late  summer as part of the   "Freedom Highways" 
program in the  city.     While   some businesses claimed the work 
of those in the  CORE program to be  the reason for a different 
position,   no one   cited  the Mayor's  Committee's  activities. 
Direct Action:     September--ITovember,   1962 
College was  back in   session.     The  local  chapter of CORE 
did not care   to waste   time  capitalizing on the work of  "Free- 
dom Highways."     Some  success  had been achieved and the   time 
seemed to be right to twist the arm of  those who might be 
able   to help  the  black  students achieve  their objective. 
On September  30,   William Thomas  turned to  one of these 
groups.     He  wrote  a letter to   the Greensboro Merchants 
Association.     The   CORE leader clearly stated  the  objective— 
"open places  of public  accommodations   ...   to   the general 
public."    Thomas  asked  the group to use  its   "influence"   to 
achieve  the  objective.      "Should you be unwilling  to do  this, 
then we have no alternative but to launch a   selective-buying 
campaign against   the entire downtown area."     A reply by 
21 
Documentation of Relevant Statements. Reports, 
Editorials. Etc.. Concernin.; Desegregation Activity in 
■-.-reensboro:  December. 1962—July. 1963. P. 1. (A 
mimeographed booklet issued by the city government on 
racial problems in the possession of David Schenck.) 
(Hereafter referred to as Documentations.) 
16 
22 
October 3 was requested. 
The Association had two alternatives.    It  could re- 
lease a  statement demanding,   or,  at least asking for, 
desegregation.     The second possibility was quiet work 
through discussions with various businessmen who ran segre- 
gated establishments.    If the group chose the  second alter- 
native,   a definite  change of policy had to be  announced by 
someone  or CORE would assume   that no work was  being  done. 
In  conjunction with the  letter,  CORE began picketing 
in the downtown area.     Pour targets were selected—two 
23 
cafeterias,  the S and W    and the Mayfair,  and two motion 
picture  theaters,  the Center and the Carolina.     Neither of 
the cafeterias served Negroes.    The Center did not either, 
claiming it did not possess the facilities to do so.     The 
Carolina pursued a policy of segregated seating. 
The proposed date for the selective-buying campaign 
24 
passed without the implementation of the tactic.  The mood 
had changed by October 11, however.  Picketing stopped at 
the two theaters and the next day it ceased at the two 
22 
William Thomas to Greensboro Merchants Association, 
September 30, 1962. 
23 
The S and W chain of cafeterias was chosen by CORE 
national director James Farmer to be one of the primary 
targets in the Freedom Highways program. 
2k 
On October 2, Stanley Culbreth, executive vice- 
president of the Merchants Association, stated in a letter 
to the Daily News that his group planned no stand and no 
direct reply would be given to Thomas. 
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cafeterias as well.  Thomas stated that CORE was "getting 
ready to set up new tactics" to apply more pressure for 
26 
desegregation.  No mention was made as to what this new 
approach would be. 
The answers came on October 13. An estimated fifteen 
hundred participated in a silent march in the downtown area. 
Members of CORE and NAACP led the march, staged to protest 
segregation in the downtown section. More importantly, 
27 
the promised selective-buying campaign began. 
For the next month, direct action leaders were prepared 
to wait.  The selective-buying campaign must be given a 
chance to work and produce the necessary pressure. The 
merchants complained that black business had fallen off 
and white customers were being prevented from entering 
28 
the establishments. 
Mayor Schenck felt compelled to make a statement. On 
October 24, he announced that the Mayor's Committee was 
looking for ways "to improve conditions between the races." 
25 
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Picketing did occur during the period,  as well as isolated 
attempts to enter the Mayfair,  the S and W,  and the Carolina, 
on September 19 and 23. 
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The mayor did not elaborate on what these ways were. 
Two days later, Thomas and CORE received some local 
support.  A group of nineteen black ministers released an 
announcement committing themselves "to work for immediate 
desegregation of the entire downtown area."  They included 
Rev. Richard Hicks, Episcopal Church of the Redeemer; Rev. 
Cecil Bishop, Trinity AME Zion Church; and Rev. Otis Hair- 
30 
ston, Shiloh Baptist Church. 
The selective-buying campaign failed to achieve the 
desired result.  On November 17, the pressure was increased. 
Forty-eight CORE members were arrested for trespassing at 
the two cafeterias.  At each establishment, the Negroes, 
one at a time, entered the serving line.  Each was read a 
statement giving the policy of the business.  Forty-eight 
refused to leave, waiting in line or taking seats.  Arrests 
31 
followed.  The action substantiated Thomas' claim of stepped 
up demonstrations. 
The CORE leader restated his position.  "This thing 
Attempts to enter and being turned awajD has been going on 
for four months and nothing has been done about it."  He 
promised a continuation of the action.  "It may take two 
weeks or two years, but we are determined."  Thomas also 
29 
Ibid. 
30 
31 
Greensboro Record. October 26, 1962, p. B-l. 
Greensboro Dailv News. November 18, 1962, pp. A-l, H4.. 
19 
mentioned a second objective—equal employment opportunities 
32 
in the city. 
James Farmer arrived in town the next day.  That even- 
ing he spoke at the Providence Baptist Church. The CORE 
director called the selective-buying campaign a success. 
He also felt that blacks must be prepared to go to jail 
to achieve their objectives. Blacks had their bodies for 
demonstrations, their purchasing power to hurt the economy, 
33 
and their vote to determine their representatives. All 
must be prepared to suffer. 
On November 22, sixty were arrested.  Operations were 
expanded to include the Carolina theater as well as the two 
cafeterias.  Nineteen were arrested at the theater, twenty- 
four at the Mayfair, and sixteen at the S and W.  The Negroes 
said that they fully expected to be served. It was Thanks- 
3k 
giving day. 
The final demonstration occurred five days later. 
Twenty-four blacks attempted to enter the serving line at 
the S and W.     No arrests were made.    Again,   the Negroes 
35 
expected to be  served. 
Two days later, more local support appeared for the 
32 
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COKE effort.  A letter was sent to Bland Worley, the chairman 
of the Mayor's Committee, signed by sixteen prominent black 
citizens.  The signatures included those of Hicks, Hairston, 
and Dr. George Evans, a physician.  Tne letter gave full 
36 
support to the activities of the previous weeks. 
Tne activities, except for the selective-buying cam- 
paign, ceased after November 27.  Tne latter stopped on Jan- 
uary 18.  Tne reason given by CORE, in both cases, was the 
position of the city government.  Tne city leaders believed 
if tensions were removed, perhaps negotiations could begin. 
Direct action had failed, so this seemed to be the only answer. 
Even though the blacks failed to achieve their object- 
ives, some important results came out of the efforts.  CORE 
gained the support of important allies.  Tne demonstrations 
helped snape up the small CORE group.  Tactics were used, 
objectives were stated.  COrtK was ready when the time came 
to move again. 
Most important of all, the Mayor's Committee was pushed 
into a policy statement—something that it would not have 
done, were it not for the demonstrations.  The statement 
was released four days before Christmas.  Tne Committee 
endorsed the principle of equal treatment and urged bus- 
inesses to consider serving all people, but deplored the 
36 
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CORK statement, issued March 21, 1963.  (In poss- 
ession of David Schenck)  (Hereafter referred to as COR* 
statement) 
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tactics that were used to achieve the objective.  "The 
Committee disapproves of the attempt to accomplish objectives 
by any group through the use of unlawful activities."  Tne 
group promised to use its efforts to encourage "consideration 
of the principle of equal treatment." But, this could be 
accomplished "only in the absence of Illegal activity and 
38 
in an atmosphere permitting reasonable negotiations." 
The statement reinforced the city's position.  No real 
pressure could be placed on the segregated businesses, 
because this would violate the rights of private property. 
Aside from the disapproval of segregation, the statement 
was weak.  The committee had principles which could not 
be violated. 
CORE and the rest of the black leadership in the city 
were not the only people the Mayor's Committee had to deal 
with.  The owners and managers of segregated businesses 
were another obstacle to overcome.  The policy of these 
men was one of determination and stubbornness.  It was a 
position that could not be ignored. 
3b 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE POLICIES OP ECONOMIC SEGREGATION 
The Legal Arguments 
It is the overwhelming preference of my customers— 
that the cafeteria and restaurant policy remain as it 
has been.  I am in business to satisfy my customers and 
when I fail to do that I will quickly cease to operate 
profitably. 
A company must make business decisions primarily 
from an economic consideration and that is what I must 
do today.39 
This statement was made by Boyd Morris, owner of the 
Hayfair Cafeteria.  While it was written in 19&3, it still 
reflected an earlier policy. Morris and the others were in 
business to make a profit, and the only way to make a profit 
was to satisfy the regular customers, or they would no longer 
patronize the establishment.  In other words, the businessmen 
were not segregationists; their customers were.  According 
to Muse, "they Cthe businessmenj envisioned, upon the removal 
of the racial barriers, a rush of uncouth Negroes to inundate 
even the better white restaurants." 
Legal arguments were also used to back up the policy. 
The United States Constitution, court decisions, and the 
absence of a state or local law were used as sanctions for 
these stands.  Legally, Morris and others in Greensboro 
were correct.  Perhaps under existing legal usage they were 
not bound to serve anyone they did not wish to. 
39 
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The  argument used by businessmen to  justify segregation 
in public accommodations tended to rely on two main premises. 
First,   common law did not make it  the duty of the  businesses 
involved to   serve all.     This was  a primary contention in 
iforth Carolina  and throughout the South.     The  second premise 
rested on the  Constitution of the United States as  inter- 
preted by the Supreme  Court.     While publicly-owned facilities 
had been ordered to desegregate by the higher court,   no 
decision had been made  by 1962 on the matter of privately- 
owned public  facilities.     In  the  absence of a  state  law, 
therefore,   discrimination was understood to be a legitimate 
practice. 
The common law argument was partly sound and partly 
wrong. A distinction must be made between innkeepers or 
those who ran a motel or a hotel and restaurant owners. 
An inn is basically an establishment which houses guests 
on a temporary basis, and an innkeeper is a person who 
runs the facility. On the other hand, a restaurant is a 
place where food is served. If the owner of this restau- 
rant also rents   rooms   "his establishment^ is3 a hotel.. 
An  innkeeper is bound by common law to  serve  all.     He 
is   "not  permitted to discriminate  in favor of or against any 
k2 
m 
In this chapter consideration will be given to 
motels, hotels, restaurants, and theaters only. 
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class or pick and choose his guests..." 
English common law bound innkeepers  to receive  and 
lodge all   travelers  and to entertain them at reason- 
able prices without any   specific or previous contract, 
in the absence of reasonable grounds for refusal.W 
In 1895,  in the  case Robins v.  Gray,   the English courts 
again  stated the place  of common law in this matter. 
...he/lthe  innkeepecl/ is  equally bound to receive and 
entertain all persons,  and is not entitled to pick 
and choose between them or tp^accept certain persons 
as guests and refuse  others.**--> 
When the United States  Senate Committee on Commerce was 
conducting hearings on  the public accommodations bill in 
1963,   opinions on this matter were  received.     Jacob  Javits, 
a member of  this  committee,   received two letters from law 
professors which also  stated that,   under common law,   inn- 
keepers had the   obligation to  serve   all who could afford 
46 
the price.     Clearly,   an obligation did exist in this matter. 
Under common law,   if a restaurant owner wishes,  he may 
47 
refuse those who ask for admission.  Thus, the owner of 
kJ 
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a restaurant was not bound as  the   innkeeper wan. 
The Constitution of  the United States provided  IJ- 
second basis of argument  for  segregation.     Three aaunA   •    v 
were   considered  in this area.     The   fifth amendment   •,/•'</:<■ 
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violated the first section. 
The Supreme Court, eight years later, in the famous 
Civil Rights Cases, declared the act unconstitutional. The 
high court felt that Congress had overstepped its bounds, 
because it did not possess the power under these two amend- 
ments to enact such a law. 
In 1890, the Louisiana state legislature established 
a law which required separate but equal facilities for 
whites and Negroes. Homer Adolph Plessy was arrested for 
violation of this act when he refused to sit in the "colored" 
section of a train during an intrastate trip. The case 
reached the Supreme Court. The decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) "stood as the principal legal obstacle 
to civil rights for the American Negro" for more than half 
a century.  From that time on, separation of the races was 
officially the constitutional doctrine for the courts of 
the United States. 
After 195^» the Supreme Court felt compelled to reverse 
itself with regard to PI easy v. Ferguson.  In that year, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the court struck down separation 
of the races in public school education. Subsequently, th^ 
court declared that all publicly owned accommodations had 
to serve all those who requested the service. In 1961, the 
court went even further. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, the court declared that public facilities owned 
\ 
w 
Ibid, p. 291*. 
<n 
by private enterprise, but controlled by a governmental 
agency, also had to serve all who could afford the price. 
The case involved a coffee shop located on premises leased 
to it by municipal government. However, it was not until 
three years later that the court would decide that pri- 
vately-owned public facilities could not discriminate. 
In the absence of a national law or a national court 
decision, each state had to decide for itself what its 
policy was toward discrimination and segregation.  By 1963* 
thirty-one states and five cities had passed laws forbidding 
these two practices in public accommodations.  Other states 
did not possess such statutes.  According to Greenberg, 
"private proprietors who serve the public and are not under 
duty to serve all, may discriminate on racial grounds unless 
50 
forbidden by state or local law."   Where laws of this type 
did not exist, local custom prevailed. 
North Carolina did not have such a law.  Segregation 
and discrimination were neither allowed nor disallowed, 
51 
according to the statutes of the state.   While a few cities 
within the state had a law allowing for the twin practices, 
the rest of the cities were faced with local custom.  If 
it was the custom of the majority of the businesses in a 
50 
Greenberg, p. 101. 
51 
Hearings, p. 935* 
52 
Durham had such an ordinance which enforced segre- 
gation in those restaurants which served both races. 
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city to act in a particular way,   then most,   if not all, 
businesses pursued this policy.     In  the  state,   because 
of  the  refusal  to accept  the entire doctrine  of  common 
law,   the  businessmen were   completely within the  law. 
Despite  the  validity  of the  legal  argument within 
North Carolina and  other states  that  did not have  a  law 
prohibiting  the  practices,   the moral  aspects  of  the 
argument were very invalid.    First,  the refusal of many 
motels,   hotels,   and restaurants   to  serve Negroes  created a 
hardship  on the highways.      "Black"  facilities  were  few 
and  far between,   and most were  in poor condition.     Second, 
to  be  turned away was also humiliating and unfair.     This 
humiliation existed whether the establishment was on the 
highways  or in the  downtown area  of a  city.     Blacks,   find- 
ing  equality in  the  armed  forces,   or in some  other capacity 
in the 1950* s did not want  to face treatment as second- 
class citizens any longer. 
Public Accommodations  in Greensboro 
Greensboro did not have an ordinance  to determine 
the  policy of privately-owned public  facilities.     Thus, 
prior to i960,  all such accommodations were either run 
on a  segregated basis  or did not  serve  Negroes  in any 
terms.     The  situation  changed through the  sit-in move- 
ment in  I960 and other non-violent direct action  that 
occurred  in the  city after  that  year.     In a  few  cases, 
businessmen did change  their policy without being  "pushed" 
29 
into it.  By March, 1963, it was estimated that ten percent 
of all eating places in the city were open to blacks as 
53 
well as whites.   The other restaurants, motels, hotels, 
and theaters still adhered to the old methods. 
Three men dominated the policies and actions of the 
businessmen after September, 1962.  Armistead Sapp, Jr. was 
the attorney for the S and W cafeteria and the Center 
theater.  Sapp's policy was to tell his clients what they 
should do and say, and then to demand that they follow 
5k 
his directives.   Neither of his clients objected.  Sapp 
was also the attorney for the Hot Shoppes restaurant 
and Meyer's Department Store Tea Room.which were desegre- 
gated in 1962.  Sapp was mainly concerned with desegregation 
on his own terms.  The time was right in 1962 for the two 
restaurants to change their policy, but the cafeteria and 
the theater had to remain separate, not serving Negroes 
in any manner. 
Boyd Morris, owner of the Mayfair cafeteria and a 
former mayor, (1955—1957) was also an outspoken person, 
never budging from his position.  He had been running his 
establishment since 19^0, employing many Negroes on his 
kitchen staff, but never serving any blacks. 
TT 
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The  final important figure  among the  businessmen was 
Neil  McGill,   manager of the  Carolina  theater.     He  listened 
to  the words  of  the home  office  of the Wilby-Kincey chain 
In Charlotte, never striking out on his own. 
On July 25,  I960,  the lunch counters at two downtown 
variety  stores were  desegregated as  a result  of  the  sit-in 
movement in  the  city.     Over the next  two  years,   other 
public facilities changed their policy,  either because 
of various direct action programs or because they felt 
their old policy was wrong. 
Others  were not willing to  change.     Before  September, 
1962, most were willing to adhere to the legal arguments 
and to the  claim that desegregation would offend their 
regular customers.     The direct action of late 1962 affected 
the   basic wording  of the policy.     On October 23,   fifty blacks 
attempted to enter the S and W cafeteria.     Speaking for 
his   client,   Sapp   said  that  "the  S and W will continue  its 
56 
policy of not knowingly admitting any demonstrators." 
This idea of not serving "demonstrators" now became the 
general policy of the downtown targets. 
Like the direct action movement, the businessmen 
relied on various practices. The first tactic was that of 
searching for undesirables in the black ranks.  Sapp found 
two in October, 1962.  Victor and Alice Jerome (the latter 
a teacher at Bennett College) were members of CORE.  Sapp 
 55 "— 
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accused them of being Communists, and there was in fact 
evidence that Mrs* Jerome had, at least in the past, been 
a member.  CORE dismissed the couple, and Bennett fired 
Mrs. Jerome.  Both organizations denied any knowledge of 
the background of the two.  Nevertheless, Sapp continued 
57 
to boast of his "discovery." 
A second tactic was to urge members of the Mayor's 
Committee or those in the city who were white and wanted 
desegregation to "clean their own house first." White 
ministers in Greensboro were concerned about the matter 
of segregation, and a few days before Christmas, 1962, 
some of them urged businessmen to change their policy. 
Sapp told them to desegregate their churches before 
58 
demanding that anyone else change.  In April, 1963, Sapp 
expanded this "house cleaning" demand to the Mayor's 
Committee.  They should, he said, desegregate their own 
businesses before telling anyone to act in a certain 
59 
way.  Morris announced that he would change his policy 
if large corporations in the city were willing to put 
60 
Negroes in a responsible position in their company. 
By January, 1963, the policy of the businessmen was 
 %7 
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basically the same as it had been earlier.  In Greensboro, 
most businesses either refused to serve blacks at all or 
to serve them only on a segregated basis.  The selective- 
buying campaign was called off to give the city government 
a chance to act.  It would still be four months before 
Dr. King would arrive in Birmingham, Alabama. 
33 
CHAPTER I4.: THE SPIRIT OP THE POUR FRESHMEN RENEWED 
On May 11, 1963, William Thomas and three other direct 
action leaders were arrested for trespassing at McDonald's 
hamburger drive-in. The demonstrations had begun with 
picketing and then expanded to various attempts to gain 
61 
service at the establishment. That night marked the first 
of fourteen days of sustained efforts on the part of the 
direct action movement in the city.  Events in the nation 
as a whole and in Greensboro itself caused blacks to return 
to the streets. 
Rising Expectations of Negroes in the United States 
By 1963, events had reached a point where Negro leaders 
were becoming frustrated with the failure of various agen- 
cies to carry beginnings in various areas to lengths that 
would move blacks any considerable distance down the road 
to equal opportunity in all facets of the American system. 
Despite the school desegregation decision by the Supreme 
Court in 195I+, many schools in various states were still 
operating on a segregated basis.  According to King, 
One must understand the pendulum swing between the ela- 
tion that arose when the edict was handed down and the 
despair that followed the failure to bring it to life. 
 61 
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Congress declared "war" on voting inequalities with the 
Civil Rights acts of 1957 and I960, but many blacks in the 
Deep South were still prevented from voting. Various states 
and cities had passed laws outlawing discrimination in 
public facilities, but southern states had refused to follow 
suit.  In many areas there was no guarantee that a Negro 
could live anywhere he wished. Perhaps worst of all, the 
overall attack declared by President Kennedy in February, 
1963 was one affording only "piecemeal improvements" which 
9 63 
many civil rights leaders found disappointing. 
The rising expectations of blacks in the nation, and 
especially in the South, had been thwarted.  This frustra- 
tion occurred in the year of the one hundredth anniversary 
of the Qnancipation Proclamation, the symbol of freedom 
from slavery.  Celebrations were being planned throughout 
the country to commemorate the event.  King wrote that 
all the talk and publicity accompanying the centen- 
nial only served to remind the Negro that he still 
wasn't free; that he still lived a form of slavery 
disguised by certain niceties of complexity. **■ 
According to King, "the milestone of the centennial of 
65 
emancipation gave the Negro a reason to act...1 
In April, 1963, King and his followers began an effort 
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in Birmingham, Alabama,,to end discrimination and segregation 
in that city.  Small at first, the demonstrations grew, 
meeting the full force of the city's law enforcement agen- 
cies, led by the police commissioner, Eugene "Bull" Connor. 
On May 2, police dogs were turned loose and fire hoses 
turned on.  The conscience of America was shocked. Accord- 
ing to .v'askow, 
The events in Birmingham signaled to equalitarian 
whites and Negroes all over the country that there 
could now be no exemptions, no delay, no retreat for 
them from the Southerners. 66 
The Hesumption of Direct Action in Greensboro 
By March, the patience of black leaders in Greensboro 
was over.  No evidence of work by the Mayor's Committee was 
apparent to the local chapter of COKE. Despite the pleas 
of men like John Taylor, the policy of all the old targets 
and other businesses remained unchanged.  On March 12, 
direct action leaders began picketing city hall because 
"no positive stand" had been taken by the Mayor's Committee. 
COR*, stated that they were "resuming demonstrations because 
the Human Relations Committee and community leaders leave 
67 
us no other alternative." 
Picketing occurred once a week for three weeks.  This 
activity "pushed" the Mayor's Committee into revealing what 
they were trying to accomplish.  On April i\.t   the group 
66 
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announced that it had taken some action.  Letters had been 
sent to "a number of restaurants and cafeterias asking 
them to open their doors to Negroes." The committee said 
that it would "appreciate an answer" and the reply would be 
held in confidence, never going outside the membership of 
68 
the group. 
Morris quickly released his reply to the press.  That 
same day he said that 
I am a private individual owner and historically 
have reserved the right to serve who I please.  I 
have run my business this way and want to continue 
to do so. °9 
No change was forthcoming from his quarters. 
On April 8, Sapp spoke at A and T College.  The exchanges 
were loud and angry, but the lawyer managed to put his points 
across.  He again mentioned the legal argument, urged the 
Mayor's Committee members to desegregate their own busi- 
nesses before asking anyone else to do so, and again told 
black students that his clients would not serve demonstra- 
70 
tors. 
Two weeks later, two Negroes attempted to desegregate 
the seating area at the Biff-Burger hamburger drive-in. 
Service was given to only those blacks who would promptly 
leave the premises. These two refused and were arrested 
"58" 
Greensboro Daily New3. April $,  1963,   p.   B-l. 
69 
Ibid. 
70 
Ibid. April 9, 1963, P. B-l. 
37 
for trespassing.  Three days later, the establishment 
71 
changed its mind and desegregated. 
Negro pressure on the city government was increased 
from sources outside the direct action movement. Dr. 
George Simkins, the local president of the NAACP chapter, 
wrote two separate letters to Mayor Schenck, questioning 
72 
the equal employment practices of the city. Schenck stated 
that the city does not practice discrimination in employment. 
On May 2, the dogs attacked King and his supporters 
in Birmingham.  On May 5» Bennett College announced that 
7k 
King would speak at its commencement in early June.  Six 
days later, 
in the light of this stalemate and inactivity; with 
our patience wounded by the dogs in Birmingham; with 
our spirit charged and shocked by cattle rods and 
police brutality in Gadsden, Alabama in the spring 
of 196375 
demonstrations were resumed in the city "to awaken the 
conscience of the city and to serve notice that Greensboro 
73 
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can no longer remain in business as usual." The symbolism 
was unmistakable.  That day four men were arrested, the same 
number that began the sit-in movement in the city three 
and one-half years earlier.  On May 11, 1963, "the revolution 
77 
of the four freshmen was invigorated and renewed." 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE DEMONSTRATIONS:  PART ONE 
The demonstrations that began in Greensboro on May 11 
continued, uninterrupted for a two-week period.  Five phases 
were evident in the action.  Phase one, May 11— May Ik,  was 
marked by attempts to gain service at McDonald's.  Some ac- 
tivity did occur in the downtown area, but the drive-in was 
the primary target during this period. It ended with the 
announcement of a change of policy at the establishment. 
This success resulted in a stepped-up effort which marked 
the second phase on May 15.  On that day, a large number 
of those participating in demonstrations in the downtown 
area were arrested. The city was now forced to act.  The 
government persuaded the city's two merchant groups to is- 
sue statements. 
The demonstrations entered the third phase on May 16— 
a "wait and see" period.  The failure of the statements to 
have any immediate affect on the policy of the downtown 
targets pushed the activity into the fourth phase, May 17— 
May 21.  This was clearly the most militant period.  A 
large number of arrests were made each night, with only one 
exception.  Again the city was forced to act. On the morn- 
ing of May 22, Mayor Schenck announced the appointment of a 
Special Committee to settle the racial problems.  The final 
phase was a reaction to this appointment.  Pew arrests 
occurred during the next three days.  On May 25, CORE and 
40 
their supporters decided to give the city some time.  A 
"truce" was announced, ending the two weeks of sustained 
efforts. 
Phase One:  May 11—May llj. 
In 1963* McDonald's had three locations in Greensboro. 
That on Summit Avenue was not far from the black colleges. 
The other two were located in the outlying areas.  The 
Summit Avenue facility was also within walking distance of 
the downtown area, another important consideration.  The 
policy of McDonald's was one of no service to Negroes.  This 
was a matter of local custom in the city itself, for each 
city in the chain was considered separately.  Greensboro, 
with mainly segregated eating accommodations, was determined 
by the North Carolina office of the chain to be a city in 
which the best policy to follow was the custom of the other 
"white" facilities.  Previous direct action efforts during 
the summer of 1962, as part of the Freedom Highways program 
in the city, had failed to produce any change. 
On May 11, picketing began at the Summit Avenue location. 
Attempts were made to obtain service, and four men who were 
denied accommodation refused to leave the serving area. 
Trespassing charges were brought against Thomas; Rev. Alfred 
Stanley of the United Presbyterian Church and a member of 
CORK; Rev. James Busch, a professor at Bennett College; and 
Robert Patterson, an A and T College student.  After the 
arrests, the remainder of the participants moved into the 
kl 
downtown area. Attempts were made to enter the S and W and 
78 
Mayfair cafeterias.  No arrests were made.   The revolu- 
tion of the four freshmen had been renewed. 
The next day, the demonstrations gained momentum. One 
hundred blacks picketed the establishment, creating a count- 
er demonstration from whites. John Dorn, the manager of the 
drive-in, sensed the possibility for a clash. Whites carried 
signs reading, "Go Back to Africa" or "White yes, Black, no" 
or "Blacks, Go Home." Police did not disperse either group, 
allowing the twenty-four whites to continue the protest. 
Dorn closed the establishment an hour early, but the demon- 
79 
strations continued until the regular closing time. 
Thomas, out of jail and back in control, lashed out at 
the police and the city government.  "I feel that if inci- 
dents such as this are allowed by the police there is a danger 
that another Birmingham will break out in Greensboro." 
80 
"CORE has always been willing to negotiate but cannot get 
81 
any support from the city government."   Thomas and CORE 
were not willing to sit on their hands and wait. 
The two nights of demonstrations occurred at an unfor- 
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tunate time for the city government.  On May 7, elections 
were held for a new city council.  The body is elected at- 
large, the council itself electing the mayor, who is usually 
the candidate who receives the highest number of votes in 
the council elections.  David Schenck ran well ahead of the 
rest of the other six who were elected.  The five incumbents 
to be re-elected were William Trotter, William Polk, Roy 
Mxllikan, Kobert Bell, and Roger Matthews.  Forrest Campbell 
was the only newly elected member.  One incumbent, Waldo 
82 
Faulkner, a Negro, was defeated for re-election.   On Monday, 
May 13, Schenck was re-elected mayor by the council. 
Schenck responded to the two nights of activity in a 
statement made after the council vote.  Tne mayor indicated 
that he was aware of the "churning and surging tide of human 
events throughout the South, and throughout much of the 
83 
nation."   What the mayor meant by the phrase "still we 
Qk 
are yet to face the greatest challenges..."   was uncer- 
tain.  Were these "greatest challenges" in Greensboro? 
Schenck felt they were.  The mayor felt that many gains had 
already been made by Negroes in the city, but "the incred- 
ibly complex field of human relations" would still produce 
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new problems for Greensboro. Schenck did not say whether 
the city had any new Ideas for solving these problems. 
That evening,  demonstrations were again staged at 
McDonald's.    Without a decision on the state level, Dorn 
again had to refuse service.    The manager looked out his 
window,   saw the white counter-protesters and heard the 
chants.     "Negro, Go Home!"     "One, Two, Three,  there go the 
niggers from A and T."    At  8:15 p.m.  Dorn closed the drive- 
in and issued a statement.     "We're closing because of the 
whites,  not the Negroes.    We  just don't want any trouble... 
86 
We're closing for the good of the community." 
The participants walked downtown.    At the S and W, 
fifteen blacks attempted to gain service.     The assistant 
manager blocked the doorway.     Picket lines were  set up.    At 
the Mayfair,  a   small-scale   sit-in was   staged.     Nineteen 
Negroes took seats after being refused service.    Morris 
87 
asked them to leave.    All complied. 
On May 1/j.,   all  three McDonald's were   scenes of demon- 
strations.    Later,  a march, with three-hundred and fifty 
blacks  taking part,  was  staged  in the  downtown area.     As 
the marchers were returning to the A and T campus,  rock 
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throwing broke out between the Negroes and whites who were 
88 
following them.  No arrests were made. 
The next morning, McDonald's changed its policy in 
Greensboro.  The state manager of the chain, John Szyperski, 
released a statement to the press announcing that he wanted 
to prevent any further trouble which could be a "serious 
89 
blot on the local community and the city."   As of May lf>, 
the three McDonald's in Greensboro "will commence serving 
90 
all law-abiding people regardless of color..."   A victory 
was achieved.  The first phase had come to an end. 
Phase Two: May 15 
The "victory" at McDonald's, combined with the apparent 
lack of attention from the city government, moved the demon- 
strations into the second phase.  Their hopes raised, Negroes 
believed the time was right to make a push. 
The scope of the activities that occurred on the even- 
ing of May 15, was unprecedented. Two hundred and thirty- 
seven blacks and four white supporters were arrested for tres- 
passing or blocking fire exits. The S and W was the first to 
feel the effect.  Five blacks tried to enter the serving line 
but were refused service. Approximately four hundred then 
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appeared.  Several moved into the line. Again, they were 
told to leave. They refused and were arrested.  Several 
more moved into place.  They were told the policy of the 
establishment and asked to leave. Again, refusals were 
countered with arrests.  Several more moved into place. 
The process was continued. 
After a few groups were arrested, the remainder moved 
on to the Center theater. The same procedure took place. 
This time, the charge was blocking fire exits.  The remainder 
moved on to the Carolina theater where they were arrested 
on one of the same charges as their cohorts. At the three 
locations those arrested included 1$3 students from A and T, 
3k  from Bennett, four whites from Guilford College (an insti- 
tution affiliated with the Quaker church) and I4.9 non-college 
91 
people. 
Thomas again had a statement to make.  If negotiations 
92 
were to begin, the demonstrations would end.   Again, the 
activities were controlled by the students, primarily the 
ones associated with CORE. 
Phase Three: May 16 
The next day was a busy one for all.  The activities 
that took place in the morning and afternoon moved the 
demonstrations into a third phase.  This phase was a 'wait 
91 
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and see"  period,   lasting  only  one day. 
In  the morning,   the  board of directors  of  the Greensboro 
Chamber of Commerce and  the   board of directors  of  the 
,-reen3boro Merchants Association met at  separate  locations. 
The iiayor's Committee had approached the  Wo groups on May li|., 
asking  them to  release a policy  statement.     The  stepped-up 
activities of the   l^th placed  the  statement in a new light. 
The path had been  tried in Raleigh.     There,   the merchant 
groups urged the   "removal  of all policies in both govern- 
ment and business which deny rights and services because 
93 
of race."   Perhaps a similar statement in Greensboro 
would end the demonstrations.  The city government felt it 
was worth an attempt. 
In the longer statement, the board of directors of the 
Chamber of Commerce endorsed "the principle of equal treat- 
ment." The board "urges business firms to begin immedi- 
ately serving all persons of the community." The board 
also took a stand on the demonstrations, stating that 
the Board urges that gatherings of large masses of 
people which endanger public safety and disrupt the 
orderly movement of people and traffic be discontinued, 
along with unlawful activities of any kind. 94 
The position taken by the board of directors of the 
ireensboro Merchants Association was very similar.  It 
advised "that all policies be removed in both government 
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and business facilities within the City of Greensboro which 
95 
deny rights or services to any citizens."        No mention 
was made of the direct action activities. 
That afternoon, Mayor Schenck made a statement at the 
regular council committee meeting to the effect that the 
Mayor's Committee was trying to get both sides together to 
settle the dispute, but had run out of things to do when 
no success was made.    He recounted the city's meetings with 
the merchant groups and read the statements of both groups. 
Schenck called these messages an important "expression of 
96 
public opinion from the community." The statement was the 
first indication from the city government that work was being 
done. 
The reaction from CORE and  the  businessmen was  swift. 
Thomas released a statement to the press.    He accused the 
Mayor's Committee of not negotiating with the correct groups, 
either the people from CORE or the other black leaders in 
the city. 
No promises have been made  to integrate the targets we 
are demonstrating against.     We  are informed by the man- 
agement  or representatives  of the management  of the May- 
fair Cafeteria, 3 and W Cafeteria,  the Center and 
Carolina theaters,   that there is presently no change in 
policy.  97 
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Thomas was correct about the statements of policy. 
Boyd Morris affirmed his position. 
When the Supreme Court rules, we will be governed by 
that  decision.    Until that time,  our policy remains the 
same.     I am an individual business operator trying to 
make a living and pay my honest debts and keep 13^ 
gainfully employed.  9o 
Sapp also spoke out. No change will occur as long as dem- 
onstrations continue. The lawyer told his clients to con- 
tinue to  "exercise their constitutional rights."    "The 
pressure of the mob,  the pressure of self-appointed leaders 
99 
will be resisted so long as this is a city of law."      Only 
a city-wide referendum or an ordinance would be reason for 
a change,   Sapp concluded. 
Despite the negative statements from the targets, the 
demonstration that occurred that night was a minor one 
compared with the  activities of  the previous night.     Approx- 
imately one  thousand Negroes participated in a  silent march. 
No attempt was made  to enter any of the  targets  and no 
arrests were made.     CORE was willing to give -the policy 
statements of the merchant groups a chance to have  some 
effect. 
Phase Pour:    May 17—May 21 
The time allotted the businesses ran out after one day. 
No  change  was  forthcoming and  the tempo again increased. 
98 
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Sapp also spoke out. No change will occur as long as dem- 
onstrations continue. The lawyer told his clients to con- 
tinue to "exercise  their constitutional rights."     "The 
pressure of the mob,  the pressure of self-appointed leaders 
99 
will be  resisted so  long as  this  is a  city  of law."       Only 
a city-wide referendum or an ordinance would be reason for 
a change,  Sapp concluded. 
Despite the negative statements from the targets,  the 
demonstration that occurred that night was a minor one 
compared with the activities of the previous night.    Approx- 
imately one thousand Negroes participated in a  silent march. 
No attempt was made  to enter any of the targets and no 
arrests were made.     CORE was willing  to give the policy 
statements of the merchant groups a chance to have some 
effect. 
Phase  Pour:    May 17—May  21 
The time allotted the businesses ran out after one day. 
No  change was  forthcoming and the tempo again increased. 
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The most militant phase, lasting five days, was under way. 
This period also brought to the fore the beginnings of 
united activities on the part of black groups in the city. 
On the evening of May 17, four hundred demonstrators 
were arrested.  Attempts were made to gain service at the 
S and W cafeteria and the Center and Carolina theaters. 
Arrests at the cafeteria and the Center were on charges of 
trespassing or blocking fire exits. At the Carolina, a 
few of the participants entered the theater and took seats. 
When they refused to leave, they were charged with forcible 
100 
trespass. 
Two hundred and eighty-seven were arrested the next 
night.  Attempts were again made to enter the three targets 
of the previous day, as well as the Mayfair cafeteria. 
The mass arrests were having an affect on the city's jails. 
The same night, Oov. Terry Sanford spoke at a dinner 
in Washington honoring Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. The 
speech was the first indication of the policy of the state 
government on demonstrations that had occurred in Durham, 
Raleigh, and Charlotte, as well as G-reensboro.  Sanford 
related what he called "the North Carolina story." Accord- 
ing to the governor, many black leaders were not really 
working for the good of the Negroes. 
100 
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This is a time for good faith and good will and a 
determination that we will help all men and women 
achieve their best chance in life because it is the 
right thing to do. 102 
The old message of patience was losing its appeal. 
May 19 was a day that brought two new leaders to the 
forefront of the struggle in Greensboro.  James Farmer 
arrived in town that afternoon and delivered a talk that 
evening at the Trinity AME Zion Church.  The speech was a 
clear call for the adults of the community to give the 
students some help.  He said that "the segregationists 
have found out that when they start putting our children 
103 
in jail, then they'll have to get us, too." 
The meeting broke up at 10:00 p.m. The adults were 
willing to take Farmer's advice that "Our kids need us, 
101; 
right there marching beside them."    The congregation 
left the church and proceeded downtown in a silent march. 
At the head of the procession were Farmer and Jesse Jackson. 
Honor student and football quarterback, Jackson was elected 
student body president at A and T on May 16.  His role, as 
probably the most popular student at A and T college, was 
that of leader of the demonstrations. He would soon become 
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the most Important figure in the streets. 
The Greensboro Ministers' Forum, composed of the city's 
black clergymen, began to play a critical part the next day. 
This organization had also come to the aid of the students 
in October, 1962. The forum prepared a boycott of white 
businesses in the downtown area, urging 
all our friends in our respective religious, social 
and fraternal institutions to share and cooperate 
with us in the great venture for human dignity and 
freedom. 105 
That night the demonstrations increased in intensity. 
Pour hundred and twenty were arrested when attempts to 
enter the two cafeterias failed and the group refused to 
disperse. For the first time, a large number of high school 
106 
students took part. 
Mayor Schenck delivered a statement the next morning. 
Calling for an end to the demonstrations, he urged a return 
to fair play and mutual respect for all people. The policy 
of the city government must be to return the city to normal 
activities.  In conclusion, Schenck stated that "we ask 
107 
all citizens to assist actively toward this end." 
The time had not yet come for the demonstrators to end 
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their efforts.  Hours after the mayor's speech, one hundred 
and sixty-two were arrested. Attempts to gain entrance at 
108 
the four primary targets were again rebuffed. 
The mayor expected the black reaction.  On the after- 
noon of the 21st, Schenck met with white and Negro leaders 
to determine a possible path to follow.  The result of this 
meeting was the appointment, the next day, of the Special 
Committee on Human Relations, a temporary body, with orders 
109 
to find a way out of the city's dilemma. 
Phase Five:  May 22—May 25 
Schenck announced the appointment in a hopeful mood. 
The composition of the committee was very unlike the Mayor's 
Committee.  Instead of a majority of businessmen, the new 
group contained eight of sixteen members whose sympathy was 
with the demonstrators.  These eight were taken from the 
four black organizations that were now beginning to play a 
part in the demand for change.  Prom the Ministers' Forum 
came John Corry and Otis Hairston.  R. L. Hicks and George 
Evans were appointed from the Greensboro Citizens' Association, 
an organization of black townspeople.  The local chapter of 
the NAACP gave Simkins and J. Kenneth Lee, an attorney. 
Prom CORE came Major High, an attorney and Thomas.  Many of 
the white members were also members of the Mayor's Committee. 
ToF 
Greensboro Daily News. May 22,  1963, p. B-l. 
109 
Ibid. May 23, 1963, p. B-l. 
53 
Bland Worley,   Jack Elam,   Oscar Burnett,  and R.   Harold Hipps 
would  become  part  of  the new group as  well.     The remaining 
four white members  were B.   R.   Zane,  who had helped  the  city 
settle   the   sit-in movement  in  I960;   T.   Gordon Overstreet 
and Leonard Guyes,   two merchants;   and A.  L.   Parker,   a local 
110 
minister. 
Schenck believed  that  the  city was now in a position  to 
restore  order.     But,   order and negotiation  could only take 
place  if  the  "mass  gatherings"   in  the  downtown area were 
111 
discontinued. The mayor's  repeated  insistence  on  this 
criterion  bespoke  a misunderstanding  of the position of 
the Negroes. 
Schenck had already  robbed  the  demonstrators  of a 
leader  in Thomas.     Despite  the urging  of Thomas  that  the 
city negotiate with black leadership,   his primary atten- 
tion would now be  directed  to work in  the  committee  instead 
of being  out  on  the  streets.     His mantle of  leadership 
would now fall  on Jackson.     There was  no guarantee  that 
the  committee would be   successful.     Thomas would be  sitting 
in the meeting room night after night,   while his work or 
organization and  leadership was  lost. 
More  importantly,   if  the  demonstrations  ceased,   the 
chance  for  success  could be  lost.     The   only pressure  the 
110 
111 
Documentations, p. 8. 
Greensboro Dallv Mews. May 23. 1963, p. B-l. 
54 
blacks had to offer was the tension of direct action.  With 
this gone, the businessmen could very easily refuse to talk. 
The Negroes would lose their bargaining power.  The momentum 
of the previous work would be lost.  If the committee was 
112 
unable to achieve results, everything would be lost. 
The vicious circle was set up.  To negotiate, the demonstra- 
tions had to end.  If the demonstrations ended, the merchants 
might no longer feel the need even to consider a change of 
policy.  At the beginning, the blacks refused to take any 
chances, as activities continued for three days.  The new 
committee found it impossible to act.  The truce was in- 
stituted the next day, but with the tension gone, the 
businessmen had no reason to negotiate. 
May 22 also produced the first genuine policy statement 
from blacks.  The position was presented to the press by the 
Coordinating Council of the Pro-Integration Groups, set up 
on May 16, as a parent organization to work out the problems 
that the four Negro organizations might develop if they 
worked separately.  Its primary purpose was to issue state - 
113 
ments of this type. 
The pronouncement made ten demands.  The first two dealt 
with the efforts of the last eleven days.  All charges 
against the demonstrators must be dismissed.  The city 
112 
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council should "declare it an obligation" for segregated 
businesses to change their policy.  The third asked for 
the desegregation of the local school system.  The fourth, 
fifth, sixth, and seventh asked for reforms in the city's 
employment policy, with relation to the school system, the 
police department, and the city departments.  The eighth 
requested the appointment of at least one black to each 
city board as soon as vacancies occurred.  The ninth asked 
for the appointment of one member of each black group to 
the Mayor's Committee.  The final point asked the council 
to pass an ordinance within thirty days requiring all public 
places to be open to everyone.     If the city council were 
to act on these "guidelines" the demonstrations would be 
ended. 
The first meeting of the Special Committee occurred 
the evening of its appointment.  George Evans became the 
chairman of the group, with Oscar Burnett, second in charge. 
Evans was an important man in the Negro community.  He had 
been a physician in the city since 1935-  In IffcTi he was 
appointed to the Greensboro Housing Authority.  In I960, 
he became a member of the city school board.    As the 
first meeting was taking place, two thousand blacks con- 
ducted a silent march. 
TUT 
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The  National Guard and the Highway Patrol were  standing 
by,   but the march took place despite  their presence.     Jackson 
attempted to enter  the Mayfair cafeteria.     A dialogue took 
place between Jackson and Morris.     Morris  refused service 
to the Negro leader.     "Is   it because of my race?"   Jackson 
asked. 
"You are  a demonstrator." 
"Would you  let me in if I   came alone?" 
116 
"You are a demonstrator." 
In Washington,   the  administration began to understand 
the   seriousness of black efforts.     By this time,   demonstra- 
tions had broken out in many major cities,   primarily in  the 
South.     Many of the Negro groups were demanding desegre- 
gation of movie  theaters.     On May 22,   the Attorney General, 
Robert P.   Kennedy,   held  the  first  of a number of meetings 
with representatives of  the  owners of various  theater chains 
throughout the South,   as well as  those who owned chains  of 
hotels,   restaurants,  and retail   stores.     Kennedy hoped to 
persuade   them to act on their own  to end racial discrimina- 
117 
tion in their businesses. 
The next day, the scaled-down demonstrations continued 
in Greensboro. Fourteen arrests were made, as new targets, 
including  the  0. Henry and King Cotton hotels,  Lee's Deli- 
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catessen, and the Apple House, were added.  At the Carolina 
theater, ^ackson again added dramatic effect to his efforts. 
-'.-.is time, it was a monologue.  .Veil McG-ill refused to 
reply.  "Don't you serve American citizens?" No reply. 
"Don't you consider me an American.''" No reoly.  "Don't 
118 
you have any respect for human dignity?" No reply. 
The Special Committee reported to the city council on 
the next day that it had reached agreement on two primary 
points.  It urged that the future demonstrations be orderly 
and the participants not invite arre3t.  Second, it asked 
the mayor to call a special meeting of the city council, 
and in that meeting to adopt a resolution 
Stating it to be the official policy of the City of 
Greensboro that there should be equal treatment of 
all persons without regard to race, color, religion, 
or any other mark of class distinction. 119 
The response from both the mayor and the city council 
was sharp and to the point.  Schenck discussed the resolu- 
tion, saying that the city had no power to pass either a 
resolution or an ordinance that would have a bearing on the 
oolicy of businesses within the city.  "Our duty is to 
120 
maintain and uphold the laws of the city."     He then sug- 
gested the following objectives for the committee:  a 
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ninety-day cessation of demonstrations and continuation of 
talks with businessmen urging a desegregated policy. 
The city council reacted in a similar manner.  It did 
not have the power to pass "such ordinances" although it 
was "in complete sympathy" with the main aims and objectives. 
However, the council could not support 
the purpose for which these aims and objectives are 
intended when done in an unlawful manner as wa?have 
had happening here in the past several days. 
The statement was also a call for the Special Committee to 
work harder. 
The question of passage of a resolution is an uncertain 
one.  The statutes of North Carolina do not properly answer 
the question.  It does appear however, that the mayor and 
the city council made a hasty decision.  Various court 
cases have decided the meaning of Part I of the general 
powers of municipal corporations, which reads "Every 
incorporated city or town is a body politic and corporate, 
and shall have the power prescribed by statute, and those 
123 
necessarily implied by law, and no other."   The municipal 
corporations have those powers granted to them in their 
charters or in laws applicable to all local governments. 
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Only those expressly conferred powers, in both cases, may 
be considered. Greensboro's city charter and the laws 
pertaining to all municipalities did not expressly state 
that the city could adopt such a resolution as was requested 
by the Special Committee. 
Another section of the statutes creates the confusion. 
Article 18, Part I of the Regulations Independent Act of 
1917, revised, gives local governments the power to make 
"ordinances, rules, and regulations for the better govern- 
12k 
ment of the town...as they deem necessary..."  Clearly, 
the ordinance or resolution requested by various groups, 
including the Special Committee, would have made for the 
better government of the town of Greensboro. Under this 
section, it appears to be possible that the mayor, the city 
council and even the North Carolina Attorney General, who 
was consulted in this matter, may have been mistaken. 
The final night of demonstrations during this two- 
week period took place on the evening of May 2lf.«  A silent 
march of approximately seven hundred and sixty was staged 
in the downtown area.  Entrance attempts were made at the 
Center theater and the S and W cafeteria.  No arrests 
125 
resulted. 
On May 25, CORE announced the end of demonstrations 
T2T 
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for the time being.  In a telegram sent to the mayor, the 
group stated its position. 
As an act of good faith and as per your suggestion 
we have voted to cease student demonstrations until 
such time as we  deem imperative to resume them. We 
hope this will give you and the channels through 
which you are working diligently, an opportunity to 
meet our requests for complete desegregation of our 
community.  We call upon you to use the full authority 
of your office to this end.125 
The situation on the day the demonstrations ended was 
one of hope and dismay.  The direct action was over for 
the time being.  There was now a chance that meaningful 
negotiations could begin.  Still, no indication came forth 
from the businessmen that they were prepared to bargain. 
The city had only reacted negatively to the first efforts 
of the Special Committee.  The truce that began on May 25 
would only be a period that would add to the confusion. 
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CHAPTER 6:     THE TRUCE 
The  truce established by CORE on May 25 lasted eight 
days.     The period was designed as a  "cooling-off"  time, 
to give  the  city government and the  Special Committee a 
chance  to work out an agreement  that would be acceptable 
to all.     The  city government's  lack of consideration for 
the viewpoint of the Special Committee hampered the work 
of that body.     The  commission was forced to rely entirely 
on negotiation to achieve  success.     The  failure  of this 
method to produce reults ended the  truce  on June 2. 
The Negotiations 
Evans  reported that he was dissatisfied with the 
statements of the mayor and the  city council.     The chairman 
admitted that he was unhappy with the comments  of the  city 
leaders,   but quickly added that  the  city council and the 
Special Committee were   "all   striving for the same goal." 
Meetings would continue  to be held with both sides involved 
in the  dispute,   but Evans was uncertain as to how direct 
127 
action could be  ended completely. 
The Special Committee  continued meeting as  often as 
possible.     The  entire  commission had been divided into 
four sub-committees:     one for theaters,   one for bowling 
alleys,   one  for hotels and motels,   and one for restaurants 
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in the city.  The greatest concentration was placed on the 
sub-committees that worked with the theaters and restaurants. 
Meetings outside the city gave those within Greensboro 
city government their greatest hope for success.  On May 
28, an announcement was made that talks on the state level 
were taking place between Governor Sanford and the various 
129 
owners of segregated businesses in the state.   Schenck 
hoped that these talks would "bear fruit." Evans was also 
130 
pleased with this bargaining. 
In Washington a meeting was scheduled for May 27 
between Attorney General Kennedy and nearly twenty-five 
theater owners, including James Stembler, president of the 
Theater Owners of America. Uncertainty existed on how these 
men would respond to Kennedy's call for full desegregation. 
131 
Future sessions were expected. 
The bargaining continued in Greensboro. A meeting 
with restaurant management in the city was set up for 
May 29 by Oscar Burnett, who headed the sub-committee on 
restaurants.  Of forty invited, only eighteen attended. 
Neither Morris nor R. L. Bentz of the S and W received 
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invitations, because the purpose of the meeting was to 
determine the position of those businessmen who had not 
132 
yet expressed an opinion.  No fruitful results came out 
of the discussions. 
On May 31» Sapp announced that the theaters were ready 
to desegregate on a gradual basis.  The attorney blamed the 
pressure from Washington for the move. The statement 
133 
appeared to be only a rumor.  Schenck said there was 
"no final agreement" on the matter, and Bland Worley 
discounted the story completely:  "I know of no such 
1314. 
arrangement having been concluded at this point." 
Meetings continued in Raleigh and Washington, but it 
appeared that the Special Committee was having difficulty 
in achieving desegregation in Greensboro's facilities.  On 
May 31, Evans gave a progress report.  He said that 
negotiations toward integration of facilities serving 
the public "are not going as rapidly as we would like^ 
to see them, but they are continuing to progress. " ^ 
The Special Committee knew that change was not an overnight 
process. 
Management During the Truce 
The management moved in the same direction during the 
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truce as it had previously. The leaders of the businessmen, 
especially Sapp, were never afraid to express their opinions. 
The cohesiveness of the group also appeared to take shape 
during the truce. 
Sapp was very critical of the meetings in Washington. 
The people of Greensboro will be able to know the 
result of their secret meetings as quickly as I will. 
If they see signs of integration in theaters within 
the next three months, they will know that mob action  , 
and secret meetings are now the American way of life. 3° 
Robert Kennedy again felt the brunt of another Sapp 
attack made on May 27.  The lawyer accused the Attorney 
General of requesting the FBI to determine the ownership 
and home office arrangement of all segregated businesses 
in North Carolina; a list that would be turned over to 
James Farmer.  Sapp could not pass up the chance to invoke 
the memory of the Jeromes.  He demanded files on Communist 
137 
infiltration of CORE and NAACP.   The charges were denied 
138 
by the Attorney General's office. 
The proposed desegregation of the theaters announced 
by Sapp, appeared, in reality, once it was denied by city 
leaders to be simply another excuse for attacking Kennedy. 
There was no end to the disgust the local attorney seemed 
to have for the President's brother and the policies of 
"13b- 
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the federal government in these matters. 
The meeting of the eighteen restaurant owners and man- 
agers pointed out another characteristic of the businessmen, 
one that would become more evident as time passed. The fail- 
ure of the meeting to produce any results showed a solidarity 
among the businessmen. Either we all change or no one will 
change.  The greatest fear was the loss of white business 
in the event of a change of policy.  Even though some 
appeared willing to cooperate with the Special Committee, 
not one was willing to take a chance at this stage. 
Negro Groups During the Truce 
The Negro groups in Greensboro kept their eyes on both 
the city government and the businessmen, waiting for some 
sign that victory had been achieved.  The statements indi- 
cated that two phases were evident during the period. The 
first lasted from May 25 to May 29.  It was marked by the 
feeling that success might be achieved by the Special 
Committee or other groups conducting meetings with business- 
men who had operations in North Carolina.  The second was 
in effect from May 30 to June 1.  During this time, the 
black leaders voiced the opinion that direct action would 
be renewed. 
A mass black meeting was held on May 27 at the Church 
of the Redeemer.  This was a precautionary gathering with 
a two-fold purpose:  to decide if future demonstrations 
would be necessary and to make arrangements permitting 
66 
many college students to remain in the city if direct action 
had to be renewed. Another meeting was called for the 
139 
next afternoon. 
The annoncement of bargaining in Raleigh raised the 
hopes of the Negroes.  The scheduled meeting of May 28 
1U.0 
was cancelled.  Results were now expected from these ses- 
sions. But no one in the black leadership was prepared 
to wait for long. 
The change in the tenor of the rhetoric on May 30 can 
be ascribed to various incidents. Although Schenck and 
Evans believed that Sanford's talks would be successful, 
Morris and Sapp were quick to indicate that they would 
not change their minds.  The failure of the meeting of 
the restaurant sub-committee to achieve results disgusted 
the black leadership.  Finally, the realization that the 
Special Committee might spend weeks at its task gave the 
Negro groups the feeling that the momentum of previous 
efforts would be lost if the two weeks of demonstrations 
were allowed to fade from the memory of the city government 
and the businessmen.  Beginning on May 30, preparations 
were made to give the screw another turn. 
On that day, Alfred Stanley enunciated the CORE position. 
He complained that Greensboro was not moving as quickly as 
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either Charlotte  or Durham,   where  concessions had been 
agreed upon.     The  failures  of Greensboro were related to 
the lack of leadership,   Stanley concluded. 
That   same  day,   the  Coordinating Council announced that 
demonstrations   could begin again on Tuesday,   June  3,   if 
efforts  on any level  "have not produced positive  results 
by that time." 
On May 31,   the  Council pledged to carry on demonstra- 
tions  through  the   summer to achieve complete  desegregation. 
Again Stanley insisted that  this failure of elected officials 
U4.3 
to  "speak out"   was hindering the  efforts of all  involved. 
Jackson and Thomas hinted the next day that Dr.  King's 
expected presence at commencement  services at Bennett College 
could be  a reason  to hold a  demonstration,   indicating a 
possibility of future action. 
June   2 arrived and Negro leaders could wait no longer. 
ICvans'   statement  of no  success by the Special Committee 
convinced  the black leaders and the others  that   something 
had to be done.     A   silent march was  staged that night, 
oackson echoed  the words   that ended the  truce.     "We won't 
stop until we  get what we want....The mayor asked for peace- 
"W 
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ful atmosphere  and that's what he got.     We have  been as 
quiet and as patient as we could." 
Ikk 
The primary reason for the resumption of direct action 
was the disappointment of rising expectations.  Hopes were 
raised during the first few day3 of the truce only to find 
frustration in the failure of those bargaining for change. 
One last hope, the desegregation of the theaters, announced 
by Sapp, was found to be only a rumor.  The day after the 
newspapers carried this story and the refutations by 
^Schenck and Worley, the truce was over.  The pressure 
live was turned on again. 
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CHAPTER 7:  THE DEMONSTRATIONS:  PART TWO 
The second phase of direct action lasted for five days. 
On only one day—June 6--were arrests made. On other nights, 
the main tactic was a silent march, with scattered attempts 
to gain entrance at the targets.  There were several dif- 
ferences between this phase and that of the first two weeks. 
The crowd in the streets was different.  Instead of a large 
number of college students, the chief participants after 
June 1 were adults from the city and high school students. 
The leadership had also changed hands.  Control now rested 
with the Coordinating Council, whereas it was previously 
in the hands of CORE.  The tactics were basically different. 
Silent marches took the place of inviting arrest.  Finally, 
despite the change in tactics and fewer arrests, the poten- 
tial for violence was greater in the second period. The 
situation threatened to become very ugly. 
The Resumption of Direct Action 
On the night of June 2, demonstrators gathered at the 
Providence Baptist Church and proceeded downtown, wounding 
the truce.  No advance warning was given to the police. 
The two hundred were composed of many people from the 
community itself.  The mood was rebellious, seemingly 
1IJT During the first period,  a common practice of the 
demonstrators was to inform the police of *    ~™£    daton r- 
action.     This measure allowed the police  toJ^^^TSSh. 
ing traffic and setting up barricades to avoid a racial clash. 
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defying everyone.     According   to Jackson,  who was in control, 
"CORE can't  dictate   to the   community."    The leadership had 
changed hands.     What  do  the people want?     "Vie   are concerned 
with action,   not words,"  was  Jackson's answer.     Token 
attempts were made  to enter  the Hayfair cafeteria,   as well 
346 
as the  Center,   Carolina,   and National   theaters. 
Evans  responded quickly   to the  renewal  of direct action, 
"This demonstration  came without advance warning,   and I 
lltf 
don't know what  effect it will have  on our work." The 
chairman hoped the  result would not be adverse. 
The  regular city council meeting,  held on the next 
day,  was   the  occasion of  three important  statements,   one 
delivered by each of  the  three  sides.     Mayor Schenck voiced 
the city's position at  the beginning of the meeting.     His 
comments were a  restatement   of his  conceptions  of the 
city's place   in relation to   the recent trouble.     The   role 
of the  city was   two-fold,   according  to Schenck.     The   city 
must keep  law and order,   "and we intend to do   so;" and 
secondly,   to attempt  to get   both sides together for 
negotiations.     The mayor was quick to add again that  the 
city could not pass  a resolution forcing a change.     In 
conclusion,   Schenck  summarized what could be  called "The 
Greensboro Story,"   closely paralleling Governor Terry 
llj.6 
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Sanford's  "North Carolina Story."    The demonatrations have 
caused "a  serious erosion of the mutual respect and friend- 
ship that has  existed between the races in Greensboro." 
The  "progressive spirit" of the city will be  "replaced by 
animosity and bitterness."     The "American tradition of 
148 
fair play" must be used to settle the problem. 
On May 26 and June 2, expressions of some members of 
the white community in the city appeared in the form of a 
petition signed by 1,614.3 people urging businessmen to 
drop their barriers and serve all people. The petition 
was run by the Daily News on those two occasions and now 
became the basis for a new policy statement by the Coor- 
dinating Council, which was presented by Simkins at the 
city council meeting. 
The statement was drawn up in the form of a proposed 
resolution to be adopted by the city council. Again, ten 
articles were mentioned. The first four would place the 
city government on record as supporting an end to discrim- 
ination in all public facilities.  The fifth urged equal 
employment of qualified Negroes in city positions. The 
sixth asked the city manager to determine the standards 
and criteria for such positions.  The seventh would bind 
all city employees to the standards and criteria. All 
city boards should have qualified black representation. 
A ninth proposed that one representative from each black 
—ip ' ~7~ 
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organization be appointed to a permanent bi-racial human 
relations commission.  Finally, equal opportunity for black 
policemen was urged.  The statement evoked support from 
all four black groups, being signed by Simkins, Thomas, 
dicks, and Hairston.   Schenck turned it over to a committee 
of three councilmen for study and recommendations. 
Sapp was also present at the meeting.  The attorney 
accused Simkins of threatening the city with the Negro 
demands.  Instead, the Negro Council should be forced to 
pay $38,000 to the city for damages made by the arrested 
demonstrators at the various make-shift facilities set up 
in the two previous weeks of demonstrations to handle the 
overflow of those arrested.  Sapp also asked the mayor 
to discharge the Special Committee and suspend negotiation 
150 
"until law is restored in this town."  His proposals were 
referred to the same three councilmen for study. 
Earlier that day, owners of the two locally owned 
theaters, the Center and the Cinema, released a statement 
on the meeting to be held that night with the theater 
sub-committee.  They were convening with the Special 
Committee at the request of the Mayor, the Governor, and 
the Attorney General of the United States. There was a 
hint that some sort of an agreement could be worked out. 
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In part, the statement read, "...any decision arrived at 
will be on a voluntary experimental basis in the interest 
of civil harmony and in the spirit of cooperation with our 
governing officials." However, "no agreement can be reached 
151 
under pressure."  Still, the possibility for change was 
evident. 
A thunderstorm failed to dampen the spirits of the 
marchers  that night.    Choruses  of "We  Shall  Overcome"  were 
still heard from the group of three hundred.     Scattered 
attempts were made  to enter the two cafeterias and the 
152 
Center theater.      A chance for more disruptive action was 
avoided earlier when Dr.   King's  airplane was grounded and 
he was unable  to  speak at  Bennett College. 
On June I4.,   the first breakthrough occurred.    Evans 
announced  that an agreement had  been reached with the  four 
theaters.     The  statement  released at  that  time  read 
The  local  indoor theater management and representatives 
of  the mayor's  special  committee have met and mutually 
agreed on a tentative plan for accomplishing desegres 
gation of the downtown theaters in the near future. 
The  details would be worked out  in the next  few days.     Evans 
15* 
said  that he  was most encouraged by the agreement. 
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The response of the crusading blacks and their friends 
was to reiterate that "we are concerned with action, not 
words." Five hundred and fifty demonstrators took to 
the streets that night, led by two ministers, Hairston and 
Poushee. The marchers were told that a "walkthrough" of this 
type would be held each night and picketing at the targets 
155 
every afternoon until victory was achieved. 
Greensboro Becomes Tense 
The next two days were the most tense of the entire 
period.  On June 5» Jackson led five hundred people to 
the Municipal Building where they promptly sat down on the 
street.  Ordered by police to move on, they finally did. 
The demonstrators engaged in a verbal attack on Schenck, 
prior to and after the sit-down. New faces in the crowd 
included Floyd McKissick, a Durham lawyer and CORE field- 
worker, and Isaac Reynolds, a CORE field representative. 
Upon leaving the scene, Reynolds shouted, "We'll take the 
156 
city over tomorrow." 
One by one, North Carolina's leading cities had swept 
aside the practice of segregation.  By June 5, the night 
of the sit-down , the night of the threat of taking over 
the city, Greensboro was the only city left still clinging 
to the old practice.  The anomaly prompted Evans to say 
T3T 
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that he was 
disappointed that Greensboro so far has not  seen fit 
to take  the lead or to fall in line with other major 157 
cities of  the   state in lowering barriers of segregation. 
What was needed?    According to Evans,   the need was for  the 
city leadership "to wield its influence." 
The next  day,   June 6,   was  the day of reckoning.     The 
police  took the initiative.     Jesse Jackson was arrested on 
charges  of inciting a riot.    After the arrest,  the police 
were told that a large  demonstration would take place 
that night.     The marchers  formed at Providence Baptist 
Church at  7:00 p.m.     Eight hundred and fifty proceeded into 
the downtown area.     At  I'-kS*  fiv« minutes after they reached 
Jefferson Square,   the heart of downtown Greensboro,   the blacks 
sat down in the  street.     They were approached by Captain 
William Jackson,  who  told the demonstrators,   "You are block- 
ing traffic.     If you fail   to move...we are going to arrest 
158 
you.     Move outj"    Two hundred and seventy-eight refused. 
Those not arrested returned to the church,   clearly 
upset over Jesse Jackson's arrest.     Stanley spoke.       If 
something is not done by 1:00 p.m.   tomorrow we are going 
to  jail...and let you radicals take over." 
157 
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CHAPTER 8:  THE RESTORATION OP THE "PROGRESSIVE SPIRIT" 
The Situation on June 7 
The situation Mayor Schenck and the city government 
faced on June 7 was one of increasing tension and anxiety. 
On May 25, when the first wave of demonstrations ended, the 
mood was one of hope.  The Special Committee had just been 
appointed.  The tension among the Negroes who practiced 
direct action had relaxed.  The problem was different on 
June 7, because the position of the two conflicting groups 
had hardened.  Indeed, the objectives of the demonstrators 
had evolved into something that was different from what 
had been desired before. 
The objectives of the blacks demanding change were well 
stated in the two policy pronouncements of May 22 and June 3, 
but the Negroes had two other objectives that were not 
stated on these petitions.  These two ideas made the work 
of the city council and mayor almost impossible. 
The first objective which the blacks wanted demanded 
that their petitions be answered with "...action, not 
words." An agreement had been reached by the Special 
Committee and the theaters on June 1+.  The plan would be 
gradual and take weeks to implement.  It was words, not 
action.  Only if the Negroes could see change, would they 
be willing to stop.  On May 25, the promise, through words, 
of a possible change, was enough.  By June 7, it was no 
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longer enough.  A±l that the mayor or the Special Committee 
could work out was gradual change.  No one, among the 
businessmen, was willing to change overnight.  Despite the 
promises, despite the optimistic feeling of Evans, if the 
blacks could not see a movie or eat in the cafeteria, all 
the talk, promises, and agreements in the world no longer 
mattered. 
The four groups who led tne black cause had another 
objective in mind, one involving the mayor.  Stanley stated 
it on May 30 and Evans said it was important.  A statement 
from the mayor showing leadership in tnis matter was what 
was wanted.  To the Negroes, the leadership of the mayor 
could act like a magic wand, whisking away segregation and 
discrimination.  At least, such a statement could help the 
black cause and get negotiations moving toward the goal 
of equal opportunity. 
Was this second objective possible? On May Zb,  no. 
On June 7, yes.  The character of David Schenck had not 
changed.  Aitnougn ne believed that desegregation was 
necessary and that the only question was that of finding 
the best method for bringing it about, he was not prepared 
160 
earlier to make such a statement.    Schenck was not a 
politician, he was an insurance man. Until he was elected 
mayor in 1961, his political and municipal experience was 
160 
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: 
limited to one  term on the   city council.     He was, at most, 
a progressive  conservative:     a man who believed in change, 
but who  could not forget   the  sanctity of private property 
and gradualism.     He was a   fair man,   trying to reconcile 
all the   competing  interests,   but  succeeding in pleasing no 
one.     The Negroes were not happy with him.     The  businessmen 
were not happy with hi3  stand,   because he dared  to "talk 
the businessmen out  of their clientele,"  through the   setting 
up of a  committee  composed  of eight blacks and eight whites. 
Until June  7,   the mayor could not bring himself to do what 
was necessary to  remedy the   situation.     A  statement on his 
part was very important because the leaders of  the Negro 
movement  insisted  that that was what was needed. 
The position of the  businessmen had not changed.     Morris 
and Sapp were  as  adamant as  ever.     Sapp won the  first round 
with the   theater desegregation because it was  on his terms 
and would not take place until  the  city was "prepared." 
The rest  of   the  owners and managers were held together with 
glue-never doing anything  or agreeing  to anything unless 
everyone  else would. 
The  position of  the blacks had changed.     Stanley was 
prepared to   let  the radicals take over.     Instead of the 
desire   to hurt the businesses that made up the   targets  of 
the movement,   the wish was now one of disrupting the  city 
completely,   through the   "new"  tactic of the  sit-down in 
a major  thoroughfare  of Greensboro.     The mood was angry. 
79 
Because   the mayor was  the  elected  leader of  the  city,   it 
was his  responsibility and not  the  city manager's  task to 
quell  the  demonstrations.     By  the  evening  of June 6,   the 
situation was  so  disrupted,  and  so  chaotic  that  if Schenck 
had failed  to assert himself,   he would have  seen  the  reen- 
actment  of Birmingham.     On  June  6,  a white man pulled a 
knife on a  black Bennett College  professor.     The police 
were becoming harsher and less  tolerant  than ever before. 
The potential  for violence was  so  great  that David Schenck 
had few options. 
David  Schenck's Speech on  June  7 
The mayor  recognized that  something would have  to  be 
done before   the   June  6  trouble.     Earlier that  day he  sent 
telegrams   to  twenty-three  businessmen and city  leaders 
to meet with him on June  7  "to  discuss a matter of utmost 
161 
and urgent  importance   to  the   community."       Those urged  to 
attend the meeting included Worley,   Zane,   Burnett,   Trotter, 
If. I.  Preyer of  Richardson-Merrill,  W.   0.   Conrad  of Western 
Electric,  William Snider of the Dailv News.   Holderness, 
Charles Myers  of Burlington Industries,  and Ceasar Cone  of 
162 
Cone Mills. 
Two  steps  were  taken by  the mayor to  settle  the  racial 
unrest.     Neither  of these  steps  represented a  change  of 
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the city's  basic position,   but they did put the mayor in 
the leadership of the negotiations.     The meeting with 
these   twenty-three representatives produced a consensus 
163 
agreement to both steps. 
The first move was a letter sent to owners and managers 
of public facilities in the  city,   requesting them to meet 
with him on June 13.     He included part of the  text of the 
speech he was  to deliver on television on the afternoon of 
June  7.     The  two paragraphs urged the management to consider 
a policy change.     Schenck asked that they make  their decision 
known at the  June 13 meeting.     "I   cannot over-estimate to 
you the importance   to your City of careful  thought in this 
decision and of your attendance at  the meeting on June 13." 
The   speech delivered by the mayor on June  7 was not, 
in any way,   a  change  of principle,   either on his part or on 
the part of the  city government.     Many parts of it sound like 
numerous other comments he had made.     What was different 
was that the mayor was willing to make a  strong  statement 
endorsing  the objectives sought by the Negroes.     Schenck 
was now willing to put the prestige  of the  city government 
itself behind the negotiation for reform. 
Schenck began by recounting  the past racial policies 
of the  city;   policies   that had opened all publicly-owned 
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facilities to all people, as well as several of the city's 
motels and restaurants.  The agreement with the theaters 
made earlier in the week was in this tradition "of progress 
toward the idea of equal treatment of all without regard 
16$ 
to race, creed, or color.   The activities of the demon- 
strators were not in keeping with this tradition.  They 
had violated the good faith shown by the merchants. 
Demonstrations must atop.  "We intend to uphold the law 
166 
in this city and to preserve the peace of the community." 
The mayor then turned to those businessmen who dis- 
criminated against Negroes. The "rights under law" of the 
property owner to conduct his business as he sees fit will 
not be violated.  However, "how far must your city government 
167 
and your fellow businessmen go to protect that right?" 
Must the city be disrupted? Must extra law enforcement 
officials be brought in? 
I say to you who own and operate places of public 
accommodations in the city,...that now is the time 
to throw aside the shackles of past custom.  Selection 
of customers purely by race is out-dated, morally 
unjust, and not in keeping with either democratic 
or Christian philosophy.150 
Schenck called on all places that serve the public to 
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"immediately cease  selection of customers purely on the 
basis of race,  and to open their doors to desirable customers 
169 
of any race,   color or creed."      He then announced the 
meeting on June 13»  the  late date being established to give 
chain businesses like the S and W and the Carolina theater 
a chance to communicate with their home offices. 
The conclusion was  the strongest stand any Greensboro 
city official  ever took on the problem of race relations. 
This city cannot long endure the impasse of inaction, 
nor can it expect to progress half-climbing to the 
future,  and half-shackled by the out-dated prejudices 
of the past.     The   citizens   of this city,  both white 
and Negro,  are all  citizens and must be accorded 
equal rights and opportunities.1?0 
The image of Greensboro was damaged in the eyes of the 
nation.     "Let us now move  to restore  to Greensboro the 
171 
progressive  spirit which is rightly ours." 
The  speech was a  courageous  stand,  a   stand that no 
one had dared make  before.     It was accomplished without 
a real change of principle.    The mayor was now on record 
as opposing segregation and agreeing to work directly 
for change. 
The Immediate Reaction 
The statement was well received by the black leadership. 
T6T 
Ibid. 
170 
Ibid. 
171 
Ibid. 
83 
172 
The proposed demonstrations for that night were called off. 
Jackson, who had refused to post bond after being arrested, 
changed his mind and was out of prison. He called the 
speech "a very positive step, an affirmative statement." 
He pledged to support the mayor in his efforts. 
Thomas responded to Schenck's call for an end to demon- 
strations.  "In view of the mayor'3 statement, CORE leaders 
have agreed to suspend demonstrations for the time being 
173 
in order to show good faith.' 
Only time would tell how the speech would be received 
by the people of the city and by the businessmen who ran 
public accommodations. 
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CHAPTER 9:     REACTION AND  VICTORY 
Mayor Schenck's  speech on June  7 elicited a variety 
of responses.     The   reaction from the black leadership was 
one of praise,   with cautious reservations.     The  businessmen 
were divided over the issue.     One  group  sided with the 
mayor and his  objectives.     A  second faction did not care 
for his approval  of desegregation,   but were willing,  after 
careful  consideration,   to agree to a  change  in policy.     The 
third group refused  to comply.     During the next few weeks, 
several  restaurants,  motels,  and bowling alleys would agree 
to the  city's demand. 
The Response  to the Mayor's Speech 
The activities of the black leadership were  sharply 
reduced after June   7.     Following  the  initial reaction of 
Jackson and Thomas,   Hairston also applauded  the mayor's 
appeal.     According   to the Negro minister,   the mayor's 
speech "has  led to   the  cessation of demonstrations until 
next Friday to provide the right  climate for positive 
action by businesses..."       This cautious optimism allowed 
the Negroes  to hold an upper hand,   just in case nothing 
happened at  the meeting  scheduled for June 13.     Although 
all  the  Negro leaders were  ready to commend Schenck for his 
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stand,   the feeling was   just as unanimous that the city 
leader should have  spoken  out  sooner. 
A few businessmen were prepared to  speak out in public 
concerning the mayor's   speech.     Those  that did were not 
happy with the mayor's remarks and indicated also that  the 
meeting on June  13 would be an important one. 
Eighteen owners  and managers met with 3app in the 
attorney's office  on June  9.     The  identity of  these men was 
not made public.     Sapp used the meeting to express his opinion. 
!ie  felt   the pressure  from government  and from the black 
groups in the city,   and this pressure from both sides must 
end.     In reference  to Schenck's   speech,   Sapp  said that 
"In my opinion,   he is   just advertising Greensboro as a 
place where gangsters and Communists can come in. 
According to  the   lawyer,   he would not be   "stampeded"   into 
agreeing to a change  in policy. 
Other businessmen expressed much the  same  feeling.     In 
a letter to Schenck four days after the  speech,  C.  W.   Smith, 
owner of a motel  and restaurant,   wrote   the mayor,   "In  the 
light of present  conditions  that exist,   I would prefer not 
to change my policy and Racial Integration at this time." 
Supporting  this   same position was Edgar Goff,   the 
manager of the Midtown Hotel  Court.     In a letter to the 
T7F 
176 
Greensboro Daily News. June 10, 1963. PP- B_:L' 10* 
C. W. Smith to David Schenck, June 11, 1963- 
86 
mayor,   he wrote, 
This motel has been a  successful operation for the 
past 9 years.     It has been managed in accordance with 
the   statutes  of North Carolina and in keeping with 
the Greensboro City ordinances.     In addition we have 
devised a   set of "home  rules" to prevent violation 
of   statutes and ordinances. 
We  do not plan to change our policy of operation, 
at   this  time,   especially under duress,   coercion,   or 
compulsion.177 
178 
Morris's remarks also opposed any change of policy. 
The reaction from Evans  was notable for its  support 
of the mayor's position,  which he described as  "forthright 
and courageous."     Calm must  be restored in the city but 
"justice,  right,  and fairness" must  take the place of 
"injustice,  wrong,   and unfairness."     The chairman hoped 
179 
that the foot-dragging of the businessmen would end. 
The Mayor Meets With the Businessmen 
Thirty-five  owners and managers met with the mayor on 
June 13.     After the meeting,   Schenck prepared a statement 
lofty in praise  of what had been accomplished.     The direct 
results  of the meeting were:     all  theaters  agreed to a plan 
of gradual desegregation}   five motels agreed to admit blacks 
as guests;  and thirty-eight restaurants with a  seating 
capacity of 2,34.2 agreed to open their doors to all.     The 
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mayor then read a message   from the S and W cafeteria,  which 
read: 
If you will bring about an atmosphere free of 
threat of demonstration, then we will review our 
policies and seek that solution which is in the best 
interest of Greensboro and all concerned.100 
Schenck announced that another meeting with the businessmen 
would convene on the next day.  However, the progress that 
has been made cannot be jeopardized.  According to the 
mayor, 
In many  opinions  the  resumption of mass demon- 
strations and the irresponsible attempts to invite mass 
arrests will   severely damage the progress already 
made and deal a mortal blow to  the groundwork already 
laid for future progress.101 
Further cooperation from all  the people in the  city was 
necessary to allow Greensboro  to  "move on to better things.' 
The Black Reaction to the Meeting 
The   "results"  announced by Schenck were padded.     The 
theaters had in fact already agreed to a plan.     Of the 
thirty-eight restaurants announced,   thirty had changed 
previously.     This  "deception"  annoyed black leaders.     A 
meeting took place on June Ik between the city government 
and the  Coordinating Council.     The gathering lasted two 
hours,   and was held,   in the mayor's words,   "to discuss 
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in detail what progress has been made to date" and to 
183 
"clarify some of the statements I made yesterday." 
Although the Negro leaders were upset, Schenck urged 
confidence. 
The Meetings Continue 
The meeting between the mayor and the businessmen on 
June Ik  was encouraging. The city's two hotels said they 
would desegregate if a period of calm was established and 
the demonstrations were to end permanently.  Several motels 
were reported to be "on the verge" while Morris refused 
again to change his practice. 
The businessmen had two primary concerns in the matter 
of desegregation. The fear of the loss of customers led 
many to move cautiously.  In many cases, the desire to 
hold on to business was so strong that they wished a change 
of policy to remain secret, never releasing the details 
to the press.  Pew were as courageous as Fred Koury, the 
owner of a motel and a supper club.  He said that "I feel 
like it's time to integrate."  Koury also felt that if this 
step was taken, people might no longer pay any attention 
to the matter.  However, all members of a certain type of 
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of desegregation.  The fear of the loss of customers led 
many to move cautiously.  In many cases, the desire to 
hold on to business was so strong that they wished a change 
of policy to remain secret, never releasing the details 
to the press. Pew were as courageous as Fred Koury, the 
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business had to make the change together so none would be 
hurt by a drop in customers.  Schenck called Koury's 
statement "sensible" and "admired his courage" in the 
186 
stand. 
The position of Koury was similar to that of W. J. 
McClure, the owner of a restaurant. In a letter to the 
mayor, McClure wrote, 
As a gesture of my good faith in the matter, I 
am perfectly willing to be the first to extend an 
invitation to six negroes, whose standing in the 
community would justify their expecting service in 
my restaurant to be my guest at a time of their 
convenience. W 
The second concern of the businessmen was a complete 
end to demonstrations. On the evening of June lk»  five 
hundred blacks attended a rally at AME Zion Church. An 
agreement was reached to extend the truce.  The Negroes 
also agreed to continue the boycott, begin a stepped-up 
program of voter registration, continue rallies like this 
one, and begin a search for qualified applicants for 
possible jobs in desegregated businesses. ^According to 
Jackson, "We are on the verge of victory."  These results 
from the rally meant that the Negroes were going to turn 
to other means to achieve their goal. Two days later, 
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the final  direct action tactic was  stopped;   the boycott 
189 
of the downtown businesses ended. 
On June 17,   the committee  of three councilman,  Bell, 
Milliken,   and Matthews,  made  their report on the Coordinating 
Council resolution and the  Sapp statement.     The  committee 
took a  stand similar to the one Schenck had taken on June  7. 
The councilmen discussed the Simkins petition first. 
The request for the end of desegregation in privately-owned 
public accommodations was answered with the continuing 
feeling of  the  city that  they were not able to pass an 
ordinance   in this matter.     Secondly,  all publicly-owned 
facilities were  already open to all people.     Equal employ- 
ment in municipal positions was already a prevailing 
practice.     The  fourth request for additional black repre- 
sentation  on city boards and commissions was granted. 
According to the   councilmen,   "We  recommend that consideration 
be given to Negro  representation on all Boards and Com- 
190 
missions   D*hen vacancies  occur3."       The request for a 
permanent bi-racial human relations commission was also 
met with a hearty endorsement.     The  councilmen suggested 
that such a board be appointed and outlined possible 
membership and duties  of such a group. 
In conclusion,   the three  included a needless criticism 
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of the demonstrations.  They felt that "the agitation in our 
City has strained the good relations of all citizens to a 
191 
dangerous point."  Continuing further on these lines, 
the councilmen professed their belief that businessmen had 
a right to expect their establishments to be accesible 
to all "the patrons of their business." Law and order 
were of pressing concern.  "We feel that it is irresponsible 
and against the tradition and principle of the American 
192 
way of life to attempt to get arrested."  The black leaders 
were requested to continue the "period of quiet." 
By June 18, Sapp was ready to make one more concession. 
The S and W cafeteria, the biggest prize of all, was desegre- 
gated.  Pour blacks, including Jackson, were admitted for 
lunch, and six others, including Hairston and Hicks, were 
admitted later.  The move was praised by both Schenck and 
193 
Thomas.   The "white" reaction to the move was one of 
ace eptance.     Although "old" business fell off in the first 
few days,   the   cafeteria's business soon returned to the 
19U 
normal level. 
Eight days later,   a final agreement with the indoor 
191 
Ibid,   p.   28. 
192 
Ibid. 
193 
1963. 
Greensboro Daily New3#   June  17»  1963»   V-  B-l« 
4 Minutes of  the Human Relations Commission,   July 25, 
92 I 
theaters was announced to the public.  "Invitational cards" 
were passed out among the four civil rights groups, allowing 
them to purchase tickets.  The plan continued for two weeks 
195 
on a trial basis.   The theater managers reported no trouble 
196 
and had a large number of "colored patrons." 
An important achievement for the prospect of improved 
race relations in the city was the passage of an ordinance 
on July 1, establishing a permanent human relations com- 
mission, charged with six primary duties. The new group 
was directed to study "problems of discrimination in any 
or all fields of human relationships" and attempt to work 
them out.  Efforts should be made by the commission to 
anticipate possible areas of conflict and solve them before 
they tore the city apart again. Third, regular meetings 
were proposed. The commission was also urged to make 
recommendations to the city council "for action it deems 
necessary to the furtherance of harmony among racial and 
197 
ethnic groups in the city..."  Two other duties empowered 
the committee to appoint sub-committees and assume other 
duties that the city council might give it. 
The commission was to be composed of ten members, with 
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an understanding that it would be five whites and five 
blacks.  Each could be reappointed for three successive 
annual terms.  A commissioner could be removed "for cause." 
Six members were required for a quorum and meetings were 
to take place once a month.  All deliberations were to be 
open to the public, and a summary report was to be made 
198 
to the city council at least once a year. 
On July 15, the city council appointed the ten member 
commission—five whites and five blacks. They were W. 0. 
Conrad of Western Electric; Hairston; Lee; Simkins; Stanley; 
Rev. L. A. Lynch, Providence Baptist Church; Charles 
McLendon, Burlington Industries; Harvey Smith, Modern Metal 
Products; T. I. Storrs, North Carolina National Bank; and 
199 
Percy Wall, an attorney. 
Unlike the old Mayor's Committee, the sole purpose 
of this body was to deal with racial matters.  It was to 
meet regularly, and not merely in response to emergencies. 
The meetings of the new commission were open to the public. 
The old committee had done its work in secret. The member- 
ship would remain racially balanced; the old committee had 
had only two black members out of nine. The city had taken 
an important step toward the possible solution of future 
racial problems. 
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CHAPTER 10:     CONCLUSIONS 
On  July 25,   George Evans performed his  last duty as 
chairman of the   Special Committee.    He   reported to a meeting 
of the   Commission on Human Relations on the progress that 
his group had made  in negotiations.     The black physician 
stated  that  the most  success was made with the owners and 
managers of  the   theaters.     No trouble was reported at  the 
indoor theaters,   a  result which prompted drive-in theaters 
to follow suit.     Least progress was made with the hotels 
and motels.     The   two hotels,   the King Cotton and  the 0. 
rienry,   proved  the most   troublesome.     The  city was meeting 
regularly with  the lawyers   for the two establishments, 
urging  them to  adopt the   "Durham plan," which would have 
the businesses   serve bona  fide  customers,   but not   "test 
200 
teams or large  groups."       The restaurants,   for the most 
part,   had failed to  follow the lead of the 8 and W cafeteria. 
As of  July 25,   forty-one  restaurants  or twenty-five Per-cent 
of the   seating  capacity in  the  city had agreed to  open  their 
doors   to all.201The progress was somewhat significant,   but 
failed  to accomplish across-the-board  service. 
An example of this  continuing reluctance was given 
the day before.     Pour black college women attempted to 
?00 David Schenck to Julius Smith (attorney for the 
hotels), July 11, 1963. 
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enter the Mayfair cafeteria,   but were turned away by Morris. 
202 
He   stated that he had no plans to change his policy.       This 
viewpoint was  reiterated in September by Morris1   lawyer,   J. 
5am Johnson.     According   to Johnson, 
Our position is economic,   no more and no less.     Our 
customers prefer to  remain  segregated,   and as long as 
that preference remains for segregation,   then as an 
economic matter,   we have no choice but   to  serve our 
customers in the way they prefer.203 
The   sustained demonstrations and the efforts of the 
mayor and the Special Committee  achieved a  series of impor- 
tant results   outside  the area of public accommodations. 
The police department agreed to promote two black members to 
the rank of detective.     A Negro was appointed cashier in 
che city tax department.     The Greensboro Housing Authority 
204 
lowered its  racial barriers. 
The Commission on Human Relations continued meeting 
with the businessmen.     By September 15,   all  bowling lanes 
had desegregated.     The  0 • Henry Hotel agreed to open its 
coffee   shop   to all,   and  both hotels agreed to try limited 
desegregation in their room service.     One more^motel and 
five more restaurants   changed their positions. 
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Such results as were accomplished may be tied to three 
important  events.     The   first was the sustained demonstrations. 
If direct action had not been employed in May—June,   1963, 
the chances  of any significant desegregation of businesses 
206 
in the  city would have  been  substantially reduced. 
Gradualism would have   continued to be  the method used in 
this  situation.     The  city government would have continued to 
pursue its   slow,   secretive ways as well.     There would be no 
reason for the city to make any real effort.    The tension 
created by the  demonstrations was necessary to prod the city 
government into action. 
The mayor's   statement of June 7 was the second element 
in the victories.     If  the mayor had continued to allow the 
Special Committee to be  the   sole bargaining agent with the 
businessmen,   change may have  occurred eventually.     The  speech 
tended to make   the management seem un-Christian and un- 
American for the   continuance  of discrimination.     They were 
in a  sense,   shamed into change. 
Finally,   the action of such individuals as Koury and 
McClure and,   to   some  extent,   even Sapp,  was essential. 
Someone had to take  the lead among the businessmen and begin 
the process  of  change.     If  these men had refused to act as 
they did,   the   talks would have  remained stalemated for 
months.    All other managers and owners were afraid of the 
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economic consequences involved in such a move. 
If any dominant theme can be found in this brief history, 
it is the theme of action-reaction.  None of the three groups 
moved in any matter, except as a response to a prior action. 
One final action prepared the way for the most important 
reaction in all cases. 
In the case of the Negroes involved in direct action, 
responses were made to actions from both the city govern- 
ment and the businessmen.  The initial reaction was the sit- 
in movement in I960, a response to the years of denial of 
equal opportunity from all groups in the city. Reactions in 
the subsequent months were to actions or statements by other 
factions in the city.  Renewed activities in March, 1963, 
were directed against the city government for its failure to 
convince public facilities to desegregate. The overwhelming 
action that began the demonstrations on a massive scale was 
the violence that met Dr. King and his followers in Birming- 
ham. Without the excesses of Birmingham most of the cities 
affected by racial pressure might have escaped demonstrations. 
Once the sustained demonstrations did begin, Negro leaders 
responded to the failures on the part of the city council 
and businesses to change their positions. The final reaction, 
the permanent truce, was accomplished by the mayor's speech 
and beginning of productive talks between Schenck and the 
owners and managers. 
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The city government responded to the pressures created 
by the Negroes.    After each move by the demonstrators,  the 
city responded.     An answer was made  to the   charges or a re- 
port was given on what progress had been made or,   in the 
case  of the mayor's  statement,   the response was one of taking 
the lead in  the matter.     For the  city,   the  final stroke was 
the demonstration of June  6. 
The businessmen,   in most cases,   did not respond,   except 
negatively,   until Schenck's  speech and the meetings of June 
13 and li+.     The reaction to each step by the  city government, 
the demonstrators   or merchant groups prior to the  speech was 
one  of continued refusal.     Alter June  7»   the owners and man- 
agers were willing to  listen and,   in most cases,   take their 
time  about changing their mind.     But there was no turning 
back after that.     After the  sit-down of June 6,  the  state- 
ment by the  mayor,   and the  leadership by some businessmen, 
the victories that were achieved were inevitable. 
Despite  the numerous   successes that direct action pro- 
duced for the Negroes of Greensboro,   the goal and main 
objectives of the movement were not attained.    Tne busi- 
nessmen were divided into two camps from the very beginning. 
On one side,  the goal and objectives were never lost.    On 
the other side,   the goal  changed as time passed.    The city 
government had the  same goal and objectives  throughout the 
period and was more successful than any other group in 
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achieving them. 
The goal of the civil rights movement was equal oppor- 
tunity in all facets of life in the city. Although the 
Negroes were carried farther down the road to achieving 
this goal than ever before, the full accomplishment was 
never realized.  Equal opportunity meant more than eating 
in a restaurant, seeing a movie, or providing a promotion 
for a black policeman. Prejudices play a large role in the 
matter.  Many men did change their minds about their feelings 
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toward black people.   Nevertheless, a substantial number 
became more disgusted and prejudiced than ever before. Pew 
believed that any Negro could live where he wished.  Work 
in private businesses was still controlled by many who 
refused to believe in equality.  Equal opportunity was still 
far in an indefinite future. 
The primary objective was the desegregation of public 
facilities in the city.  A beginning was made in this 
matter.  Only the passage of the 1961+ Civil Rights Act 
would finally achieve this objective. 
The second objective was equal opportunity in employ- 
ment.  Only the city was willing to grant this desire, but 
promotions and hiring depended in many cases on the whims 
of men who did not believe in the same things as did Schenck 
or the city council. 
The third objective was inclusion of black represen- 
^07 
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tatives on the boards and commissions of the city. With 
the exception of the city council, this desire was possible 
and was in fact fulfilled.  Years would pass before another 
Negro would sit on the city council. 
The goal of the city government was to return Greensboro 
to peaceful conditions.  No more demonstrations would occur 
in the city after June 6.  Although talk, in some cases 
shouting, would take its place, no one would take to the 
streets again to achieve anything by non-violent direct 
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action.  A peaceful atmosphere was restored. 
The objectives of the city government were uncertain. 
One objective was the ending of the demonstrations. Tnis 
was achieved through the June 7 speech and the subsequent 
success in negotiations.  Was a second objective the achieve- 
ment of what Schenck called "progress" or was it to achieve 
better racial harmony in the city? Was the speech, no 
matter how noble and heart-stirring, really only a ploy 
to make Greensboro again appear to be the liberal city 
that it believed itself to be? What was the real purpose 
of the speech? It was a combination of all these ideas. 
The speech achieved the progress of lowered racial barriers, 
and returned the city to better relations between the races. 
But it was also a clever device. The ruffled of both sides 
were soothed by Schenck's remarks. No ordinance or resolu- 
tion would be passed, but entry at various facilities was 
ZOtt 
Only scattered picketing would occur in the future. 
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assured.     Finally,   the mayor was  successful in restoring 
the image of  the  city.     His comments were applauded by 
/resident Kennedy at  the meeting  of mayors  taking place at 
the same  time.     If all   these ideas were  the objectives of 
the city,   the mayor and the  city government were very 
successful. 
The businessmen were divided into  two groups—the 
economic   segregationists and the headline  seekers.    A 
further division of the  first  sector produced the hard-core 
and the willing-to-try.     Each group had a definite objective 
and goal in mind. 
The hard-core  economic   segregationists were led by Boyd 
Morris.    Their goal was to resist all efforts to achieve 
desegregation.     For the time being,   they were  successful. 
The primary objective was to hold on even after the mayor's 
speech.     They were   successful in this   endeavor as well. 
'The willing-to-try economic  segregationists were 
composed of  everyone  else but Sapp and his clients,  and, 
to  some  extent,   Neil McGill.     They had a goal which had to 
be abandoned after June  7.     The first goal was to avoid a 
change in  service.     After the pressure became  so great that 
resistance became practically impossible,  the goal became 
one of time   consumption and holding-off,   instead of being 
pushed into  change.     The primary objective was to take 
their time  and achieve  the  change on their own terms.     In 
this aesire,   they were mostly  successful. 
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The headline   seekers were  Sapp and his group.     Their 
goal was   to  achieve  desegregation on their own terms.     A 
plan had been drawn up which would have achieved service 
for Negroes  at  the motion picture  theaters  by Christmas, 
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1963. Once   the  demonstrations began,   Sapp and his clients 
were still  determined to bring about   the   change on their 
own terms.     Their primary objective was to gain the  sympathy 
of the  city  through assertions  of legal arguments.     They were 
right and everyone else was wrong and the  city was going to 
know about  it.     Desegregation at  the   theaters and the 3 and W 
occurred when Sapp,  McOill,   Bentz,   and the others were  ready. 
All their  statements found their way into  the press.     Even 
the  city government was willing to accept  the  sanctity of 
private property.     Success was as much a part of the outcome 
here as it was  for the   city. 
September,   19'->3,   the   students had returned  to the 
colleges.     Thomas i*as prepared  to inject new life into   the 
debate  over equal  opportunity.     According to Thomas, 
The white   community has not yet realized how deter- 
mined we are.     It   isn't aware   of the frustrations we 
have gone   through  since birth.     What we are asking 
for is not   something we  don't  deserve.     We are demand- ing 
ing  something  that  is  rightfully ours. 210 
Thomas was correct in all but one aspect.  Had he already 
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forgotten the days of only three months ago, when the city 
did understand and know just how determined they were? 
iou 
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